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LAWYER DECISION MAKING:
THE PROBLEM OF PREDICTION
MARJORIE ANNE MCDIARMID"
This Article examines three competing models for lawyer decision making.
Reviewing literature drawn from other disciplines, Professor McDiarmid applies each
model to a particular lawyer decision task and provides a critique both of applicability
and of the underlying assumptions of the models themselves. The Article concentrates
on the problem of prediction in the face of uncertainty.

I. INTRODUCTION

As they portrayed it on American Playhouse,' the exchange took
place between the lawyer and his clients in the courtroom holding cell.
An inspired script writer has one of the clients, I think it was Loeb, say
"if [you're wrong], we are meat on a hook." And they literally would
have been, for those were hanging times.
The lawyer was Clarence Darrow and the clients were Leopold and
Loeb, at that point accused of the heinous murder of Bobby Franks.'
The decision that Darrow was advocating was the entry of a plea of
guilty, thereby waiving trial by jury and staking his clients' lives on
Darrow's presentation to Judge Caverly alone. It turns out to have been
the right decision, of course. The summation is too deterministic for my

*
Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A., University of Rochester;
J.D, Columbia University; LL.M., Harvard University. I wish to acknowledge the
support and editorial assistance of Professors Thomas Barton, Gary Bellow, Donald
Gifford, and Jeffrey Lewin. Any mistakes are mine.
1.
American Playhouse: Darrow (PBS television broadcast, June 6, 1991).
2.
Nathan Leopold, Jr. and Richard Loeb were the sons of millionaires in
Chicago. Leopold was 19 and Loeb was 18 at the time of the trial in 1924. Bobby
Franks, a cousin of Loeb's, was 14 years old at the time they killed him. There was
strong physical evidence linking the young men to the crime and both confessed. They
referred to the killing as taking place for the "sake of a thrill." Both defendants had
planned to enter law school in the fall. Leopold had already been admitted to Harvard.
For discussions of the case and of Darrow's decision, see IRVING STONE, CLARENCE
DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE 241-73 (1958) and ATrORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 16-88

(Arthur Weinberg ed., 1989) [hereinafter DAMNEDI].
transcript of Darrow's actual summation.

DAMNED contains the edited
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taste and the psychology too Freudian, but Darrow knew his case, his

judge and the temper of his times. The young men did not die.4
Most lawyer decisions, to be sure, do not carry the kind of
consequences Darrow's did. But if the best empirical information about

legal practice is even approximately correct, all transactional5 legal
matters and the vast majority of legal disputes are settled not through the
intervention of any state apparatus, but rather through the decision making
and concomitant advice-giving activity of* lawyers.6 The lawyer's
discharge of the counseling function is virtually unstudied, yet it forms
the recognized core of much lawyer activity. It is for good reason that
"counselor" or "counsel" is the most widely used honorific for lawyers
in formal address.
A word on the purposes of this essay. They are two: speculative
and normative. There are many facets of lawyer decision making about
which little is known. It would be useful to know whether the decision

making power allocated by professional norms variously to the lawyer and
the client in fact rest where they are assigned.' It would be interesting
3.

See DAMNED, supra note 2.

4.
Judge John R. Caverly heard Darrow's three day summation and sentenced
the defendants to life imprisonment plus 99 years. His announced ground for the decision
was that both defendants were minors. Loeb was stabbed to death in prison in 1936.
Leopold was paroled in 1958 and lived out his life in Puerto Rico. While in prison he
was a subject in medical experiments involving malaria. His work after his release has
been variously described as scientific research in the field of communicable disease, see
Richard Cohen, Clarence Darrow'sLesson, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1988, at A27, and as
that of a hospital technician for $10 per week, see File in 1924 "Thrill Slaying" Case
Found, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 10, 1985. He died August 29, 1971 of natural causes.
5.
Contract and will drafting, partnership and corporation creation, conveyancing
and the like.
6.
The best quantitative data on civil law practice in the United States were
collected by the Civil Litigation Research Project funded by the Office for Improvements
in the Administration of Justice of the Department of Justice. Initial results were reported
in 1981. That study showed that less than half of all disputes brought to lawyers ended
in a case being filed. Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Clains, and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & SOc'Y REv., 525, 537, 542-43
(1981). Further, data from the Federal Judicial Workload Statistics Profile for the years
from 1985 to 1990 show that on average 473 cases per judge, both civil and criminal, are
filed annually while only an average 35 per judge reach trial on an annual basis. Thus,
as a rough measure, close to 13% of federal cases filed reach trial. The others are either
disposed of by motion (court action), abandoned, or settled (lawyer/client decision).
Unfortunately, there are no data breaking out these non-trial dispositions. See
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & REPORTS Div. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS.

7.
For one of the only empirical studies on the allocation of lawyer and client
decision authority, see Douglas E. Rosenthal, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?

(1977).
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to find out whether lawyers and clients experience the same problems that
plague other decision makers in valuing outcomes.! It would be
particularly helpful to conduct an empirical study of how lawyers actually
arrive at decisions. The exploration of ideas conducted here is a
prerequisite to the resolution of these issues.
This work represents a theoretical analysis of decision making in
which the practitioner must select action in the face of uncertainty.
Darrow did not know how the judge would decide his clients' fate. He
could make at best an educated guess. Within the domain of decision
making under uncertainty, I opt to further confine my study to methods
that decision makers have available to structure and if possible to reduce
that uncertainty, i.e., methods of prediction.
I have isolated three prediction methodologies which should be of
assistance to lawyers: decision theory, inductive probability, and causal
decision making. These methods, drawn from the realms of economics,
psychology, scientific investigation, and philosophy, might capture how
lawyers in fact decide. More likely, the methods idealize aspects of
decision making that are used much more informally in real life decision
processes. Or it is possible that they might be completely foreign to
present methods of lawyer decision making. Because of the lack of
empirical data, the descriptions of lawyer decision making offered here
are simply a set of plausible hypotheses from which to begin the research
required. As I will describe in Section IV.B, without such a set of
hypotheses, empirical research is rudderless.
But there is additional virtue in this discussion now, even if the
descriptive value of the material is speculative. The empirical study I
propose necessarily will be a protracted and uncertain process. Lawyers
need to make predictions in the meantime. Thus, the normative value of
this Article lies in acquainting those lawyers with the hard-won insights
of other thinkers on decision making so that lawyer prediction may be
8.
The fact that not all decision makers attach the same value to even as
consistent a commodity as money has long been recognized. As long ago as the 1700s,
Daniel Bernolli developed a theory of utility that equated values assigned by different
decision makers by weighting monetary sums by the worth of those sums to the decision
maker involved. For a general discussion of utility concepts, see HOWARD RAIFFA,
DECISION ANALYSIS:

INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER

UNCERTAINTY

(1968). More recently, it has become clear that decision makers do not exhibit consistent
utility curves, with the result that values vary not only as between decision makers but
also across situations faced by the same decision maker. The primary researchers in this
area have been Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. For an example of their work, see

Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in

DECISION MAKiNo: DESCRITIVE,
NORMATIVE AND PRESCRIPrIVE INTERACTIONS 167-92 (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988)
[herinafter DECISION MAKINO]. For a summary of developments in the field of utility
generally, see J. FRANK YATES, JUDoMENT AND DECISION MAKINO (1990).
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improved right now. If lawyers in fact use prediction methods similar to
those described here, the profession will benefit from reflections
concerning their advantages and pitfalls. If lawyers do not currently use
these methods, perhaps they should. At least the choice not to use them
should be informed.
An incidental benefit that is not quite so utilitarian lies in the
specification of the models themselves. Drawn from a wide variety of
sources, they have never, to my knowledge, been contrasted as they are
here.
Why three predictive methods? Most simply because predictive tasks
differ. I would characterize them alliteratively as follows. Decision
theory has as its domain the evaluation of relatively well-defined
problems. Inductive probability extrapolatesfrom known data to forecast
less well-known outcomes. Causal decision making explains the future
in light of previously identified cause-and-effect relations.
The evaluative function served by decision theory presupposes a clear
set of options coupled with a need to weigh the outcomes associated with
each. Although some decision theorists expand the use of the method to
arenas in which hard prior probability data are lacking, the method calls
for the assignment of precise values to likely outcomes. Decision theory
is also mathematically rigorous in its manipulation of these values. It
uses a probability calculus composed of mathematical operations to
transform assigned probabilities into outcome predictions. The most
common use of decision theory methodology by lawyers is in the
weighing of the relative merits of settlement versus trial. I will use an
example of such a problem to illustrate my discussion below. There the
decision maker is evaluating known options: settlement, motion to
dismiss, verdict. That lawyer can use past experience to assign numerical
likelihood predictions to these outcomes. The probability calculus will
combine these judgments and provide an assessment of the most favorable
course of action. Decision theory accommodates most comfortably well
defined problems posing clear alternative solutions.
By contrast, there would seem to be large classes of legal decision
problems in which options are not clearly apparent. Further, if those
options do emerge in the course of problem solving, it is not evident what
likelihood of success attends them. An example which I use below of
such a less clearly defined problem is the dilemma posed to a lawyer
deciding whether to take on a case in any uncertain area of the law. Too
many possible outcomes-inability to find qualified witnesses, unfavorable
reading of ambiguous statutory terms, ill-timed legislative activity, failure
to secure necessary material in discovery, etc.-complicate this problem
to make a decision theoretic approach useful. The case might fail from
myriad combinations of factual circumstances, legal rulings, procedural
vicissitudes, and political judgments. No good numbers attach to these
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combinations because no case in precisely these circumstances has gone
before.
Rather than pursue the illusory rigor of decision theory in this
instance, inductive probability, the second approach considered here,
would cause the lawyer to attempt to define broadly the variables which
should affect her judgment and then give each of these variables a gatekeeper function. If the novel cause of action required a showing of
intentional misconduct on the part of the alleged tort feasor, then evidence
of the requisite intent would be a relevant variable, and the absence of
such intent would dictate that the lawyer cease her analysis with the
conclusion that the cause of action was untenable. This use of the passfail, gate-keeper approach, of course, makes inductive probability a
blunter instrument than is decision theory, which recognizes gradations
of probability. But where precise data on a new or poorly defined
problem are lacking, it permits a more realistic assessment mechanism.
It permits the decision maker to extrapolate from available knowledge to
a useful, though gross, judgment about problematic outcomes.
The first two predictive methods, decision theory and inductive
probability, are thus distinguishable by the precision of both the problems
they address and the data they use. But both seek to produce a similar
judgment about the future: how likely it is that a particular outcome will
occur. In reaching this judgment, most practitioners of both methods use
the raw data of prior experience as their guide. What has happened in the
past is deemed likely to recur simply by dint of that prior experience.
The final method of decision making also builds on prior correlations
between choices and outcomes, but it does not stop there. Rather than
saying that the judge is likely to decide a cause in a certain manner
because she has done so with some frequency in the past, causal decision
theory looks beyond mere correlation and attempts to develop explanation.
The judge decides this kind of case a certain way because she is
predisposed by her education and values to find certain arguments
compelling. The obvious advantage of causal thinking is that, if the
causal attribution is correct, it will enable the decision maker to predict
accurately even a low probability event. The judge will decide this
particular case differently from the way she decides most such cases
because of the presence or absence of the critical causal factor. Yet, as
I will describe, there are risks in causal thinking undertaken in too facile
a manner which argue that a pure probability approach may in many
circumstances be more accurate.
At any rate, I would contend that the lawyer community stands to
benefit from the differentiation and study of the modes, benefits and
drawbacks of all three methods of decision making. In my conclusion to
this discussion, I will revisit the question of which, if any, of these
methods are likely to be used by and merit the use of that community.
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II. DECISION THEORY
A. Introduction
One approach to decision making is so dominant that its name seeks
to pre-empt the field. Referred to uniformly as "decision theory" or
"decision analysis," 9 this methodology calls its practitioners to assign
probabilities and utilities'0 to events. It then prescribes the combination
of these assignments to determine which course of action is to be
preferred. Because this essay deals solely with the predictive portion of
decision making, I will discuss probability here and leave utility issues for
another day. I will describe first the "decision theory" methodology, then
set forth some of its less obvious constraints.
B. Methodology
Let me posit for purposes of this discussion a settlement decision in
which the lawyer wishes to advise her client. This is a personal injury
action arising from an automobile collision. The injured plaintiff has
fully recovered from those injuries after a prolonged course of hospital
treatment, recuperation, and physical therapy. That course of treatment
consumed two years and cost $200,000 in actual expenditures. In
addition, the plaintiff has lost wages of $150,000 for the same period.
The plaintiff and his wife are seeking $1,050,000 for pain and suffering
and loss of consortium. Assume further that the plaintiff sustained
property damage of $10,000.
Thus, the total damage claim is
$1,410,000. The defendant's carrier, on the eve of trial, has offered to
settle the case for $800,000. The plaintiff and his wife seek the advice
of the lawyer on whether they should accept the offer.
It is the lawyer's judgment that her case will almost certainly survive
a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for a judgment of law at all
stages during the trial. It is further her belief that a jury is likely to find
9.
For a clear and relatively mathematically gentle exposition of this theory from
one of its primary current exponents, see RAIFFA, supra note 8. See also J.Q. SMITH,
DECISION

ANALYSIS:

A

BAYESIAN

APPROACH

(1988);

DENNIS

V.

LINDLEY,

INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS FROM A BAYESIAN VIEWPOINT, part 1:

Probability .(1965); S. JAMES PRESS, BAYESIAN STATISTICS: PRINCIPLES, MODELS AND
APPLICATIONS (1989); YATES, supra note 8.
10.
Utilities are the values that the decision maker assigns to various outcomes.
See supra note 8. Since not all people value even money uniformly, some method of
quantifying value must be employed. Because this Article avoids exploration of utilities,
however, I will employ throughout the fiction that the decision maker assigns face value
to monetary outcomes. A decision maker employing this utility structure is said to use
'expected monetary value." See RAIFFA, supra note 8, at 8-9.
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liability on the part of the defendant, although she is less certain of this
than of the judgment that the case will reach the jury. Finally, if the case
goes to the jury and if they find the defendant liable, she rates the most
likely monetary award as $1,000,000, although she would not be badly
surprised by a verdict of $1,410,000 or one for $750,000. She thinks
that it is very unlikely that the jury will come back, assuming a finding
of liability, with an amount of $500,000. In her view, any other verdict
is impossible." How, in line with decision theory, should the lawyer
determine the meaning of her judgments2 so that she can advise her clients
of the probable outcome of their case?'
The first chore that confronts the lawyer under decision theory is the
conversion of her likelihood judgments into numeric probabilities."
There are several constraints on these assignments which I will merely
note now. The assignments must fall between zero and one, with zero
representing no chance that the event will occur and one representing
certainty.
(1) 0 < P(X) < 1
At each decision point, all of the probabilities assigned to possible
outcomes must sum to one.
(2) P(X) + P(X 2) + P(X) + ... P(X) = 1

11.
See infra Section II.D to see why this assumption is made.
12.
I will not address here the method by which this information should be
conveyed. I will address simply how the figures should be computed.
13.
Such a conversion is in any case recommended by authorities on client
counseling.

See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUOH, INTERVIEWING,

COUNSELINO AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECIVE REPRESENTATION 252-54 (1990);
DAVID A. BINDER El AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH

339-40 (1991).
The argument that there is too much variability in non-numeric expressions of
probability is supported. See ROBIN M. HOGARTH, JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION 190-93 (2d ed. 1987). Yates, supra note 8, at 30, points to
studies, for example, in which doctors assigned numeric equivalents, ranging from 35%
to 77%, to the clause "significant chance." There is a great deal of slippage in nonnumeric probability statements.
But see MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE AND
UNCERTAINTY: EMERGING PARADIGMS 164-68 (1989) (positing that data in numeric form
may not be as useable as experiments have assumed). See also T.J. NAGY & L.J.
HOFFMAN, EXPLORATORY EVALUATION OF THE ACCURACY OF LINGUISTIC VERSUS
NUMERIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF COMPUTER SECURITY, TECHNICAL REPORT GWU-1 1ST-

81-07 (George Washington University Computer Security Research Group, 1981) (finding
that analysts' using linguistic assessments performed better largely because they avoided
the extremes of inaccurate judgments), cited in SMrTHSON, supra, at 149.
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Thus, the choices given at each decision point must be exhaustive and
exclusive. There cannot be an unknown amount of space left for
unknown contingencies. Finally, combinations of joint probabilities are
accomplished by multiplying individual probabilities together.
(3) P(X & Y) = P(XIY) * P(Y)1
To illustrate these points with the hypothetical, at the first decision
point-directed verdict/no directed verdict-the lawyer must translate
"almost certainly" into some precise number between zero and one. In
this case, let me suppose that she picks .95. (We will leave until much
later the questions that I am sure leap to your mind: "Why .95, why not
.96? Where do you get these numbers from anyway?" For now just
assume our lawyer has some good basis for making the assignment that
she does.) So far she has addressed the first requirement, because the
number she has chosen falls between zero and one. I will call this
number P(J,,). Now what about the second requirement? Remember that
all of the assignments at this point must total to one. So far she is not
there. Her sole assignment is .95. Of course, the choice here was
between two possibilities-no directed verdict/directed verdict-so if no
directed verdict has a probability of .95, it is not to difficult to accept that
directed verdict should be assigned a probability of .05. This assignment
meets our second test: .95 + .05 equaling 1. So far she is not combining
decisions, so the final test is postponed. One decision down (directed
verdict/no directed verdict), and two more to go: liability/no liability and
amount of verdict.
It would be possible to simply jot these assignments down in any
manner, but the method of choice for displaying these data among
decision theorists is the decision tree.' 5 Using it will help the lawyer
keep the assignments and the decision points clear and will assist later
with the math. So please refer to Figure 1. From this figure you can see
the situation so far. There is a settlement offer on the table of $800,000.
14.

15.

The notation used throughout this Article is as follows:
P(X) = Probability of X..
P(X IY) = Probability of X given that Y is true.
P(X & Y) = Probability of X and Y.
P(X) = Probability of not X, or the contrary of X.
< = less than or equal to.
= greater than or equal to.
Most decision analysts prefer decision trees, but some prefer decision tables.

See STUART S. NAOEL, DECISION-AIDINo SOFTWARE AND LEGAL DECISION MAKING: A
GUIDE TO SKiLLs AND APPLICATIONS THROUOHOUT THE LAW (1989). The two methods

are translatable.
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The basic decision, which is in fact the one the lawyer is attempting to
evaluate, is whether to accept this offer or take the uncertain prospect of
trial. Whenever the value of an option is known outright, as in the case
of the settlement here, it will be shown on the tree at the end of a line.
Such a value is referred to as a leaf node, thus maintaining our tree
analogy (although the savvy observer will have spotted the fact that the
tree has been the victim of a high wind or an indiscriminate logger and
is currently reposing on its side). The line to which the leaf node is
attached is called a fork. The point that connects the various forks is
called a node-or a branch point.
I have chosen to picture nodes in a manner different from
conventional usage. Normally square nodes denote decisions and circular
nodes denote chance.
Since here we have two sets of decision
makers-the client and the court (judge or jury)-I have used rectangles
for the client decisions and diamonds for the decisions of either the judge
or jury. Probabilities are entered along the fork to which they pertain.
Thus, on the first decision to which the attorney has assigned
probabilities, a .05 probability has been assigned to the fork for a directed
verdict, which in turn has a leaf node of $0, and a probability of .95 has
been assigned to the fork leading to the jury decision on liability.
The lawyer must now translate her views on the liability issue into
numerical probabilities and assign them to forks with the appropriate leaf
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nodes. Again there are only two options here, liability or no liability, 6
and the two probabilities must sum to one. The lawyer chooses
probabilities of .85 = P(Liuty) and .15 = P(Lk6 1,). These choices are
added to the tree. See Figure 2.

Figure 2
Finally, the lawyer has reached the damages node. Here there are
four options: $1,000,000 (most likely), $1,410,000 (not surprising),
$750,000 (also not surprising) and $500,000 (very unlikely). She
translates these to P($1.) = .55, P($1.41.) = .20, P($750K) = .20 and
P($500,) = .05,17 thus obeying the law in summing to one. Figure 3
shows this situation. Again assume at this point that the lawyer has a
good reason for the numbers she assigns.
I will assume for the present that every dollar is of equal value to the
client in this case. Thus, dollars gained by going to trial are as valuable
as dollars gained in settlement. This is unlikely to be strictly true, but as
I indicated above, utility issues will have to await another article.
What the lawyer now wishes to do is compute the worth of the
branches leading through trial so that she may compare that value with the
16.
Assume contributory negligence is not a factor in this case. Even if it were,
it would be better to depict that issue at a subsequent branch point.
17.
In this Article, "M" will indicate million and "K" will indicate thousand.
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$800,000 which has been offered in settlement. To do this she multiplies
the value of each leaf node by the probability of the fork to which it is
attached, adds together these values for each node, assigns that combined
value to the previous decision node, treats that decision node as a new
leaf node, and then repeats the process. Howard Raiffa, a respected
teacher of decision analysis, calls this process "folding back.""8 Let me
illustrate. Concentrate on the last set of leaf nodes at the end of the trial
branch, those which set forth the likely jury verdicts in the event that
liability is found. I want to determine the total value of that jury damages
node. See Figure 4.
The equation looks like this:
Node value = (P($1.4m)*V($l.4M)) + (P($1m)*V($lm)) +
(P($750K)*V($750K)) + (P($500K)*V($500K))
Using our figures, this is ((.20 * $1,410,000) + (.55 * $1,000,000) +
(.20 * $750,000) + (.05 * $500,000)) = $1,007,000. Thus, if the case
reaches the damages phase, the lawyer estimates that the value of the
damage award adjusted for likelihood is slightly more than $1,000,000.
But it is not certain that the case will reach that stage, so that figure must
be further discounted to take trial uncertainties into account. Here the
combination requirement of the third rule is illustrated. By multiplying
her expected outcome by the probability of a liability finding, the lawyer
is combining the probability of the verdict amount given a finding of
liability by the probability of a liability finding. This is done by assigning
this newly determined value to the jury damages node, treating that node
as if it were now a leaf node and repeating the process again.
See
Figure 5.
Using the same formula, multiplying probabilities by values and
adding the result, we get ((.85 * $1,007,000) + (.15 * $0)) = $855,950
as the value of the liability node. The directed verdict node is then
computed ((.95 * $855,950) + (.05 * $0)) = $813,152.50. This is the
final decision node on the trial branch. Therefore, this figure represents
the fully discounted value of the jury verdict, taking into account all the
uncertainties of trial. As this figure is higher than the settlement offer of
$800,000, decision theory holds that the lawyer should advise her clients
that they can do better by trying the case, all other things being equal. 9
18.

RAWFA, supra note 8,at 21-27.
19.
This, of course, assumes that going to trial or settling are free or equally
costly activities. This is obviously foolish, as the cost of trial in attorneys' fees alone will
almost certainly outweigh settlement costs. To account for this, the lawyer would subtract
the costs of trial and settlement from their respective branches before comparing the
results. This calculation, however, does not contribute to my discussion of decision
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= $o
$855,950

$800,000
Figure 5
I have spent this time on the details of decision theory methodology
to clarify its premises and to show its substantial value. If one accepts the
premises and undertakes the valuations required, this is a highly refined
and ultimately rational tool for decision making. Certainly no one should
reject it on the ground that the mathematics are too difficult. Only grade
school math and a clear chart are required. If, as with me, these
requisites sometimes test your abilities, there are a variety of computer
tools that will do at least some of the math for you.'
Shifting attention now from the mechanics to the underlying theory,
I will revisit the constraints that I breezed past above. The unavoidable
requirements are these: 1) beliefs or judgments about likelihoods must be
expressed in terms of numerical probabilities which are discrete numbers
lying between zero and one; 2) those probabilities must cover the entire
range of available options, i.e., they must sum to one or certainty; and 3)
those probabilities are combined with the value placed on various
outcomes by multiplication. Although I am using the mathematical
theory, so it is omitted here.
20.
Any one of the excellent computerized spreadsheets on the market will do the
math flawlessly, if you plug in the proper formulas. In purely alphabetical order, see for
example, Excel, Lotus 123, and Quattro. There are specialized decision tree packages as
well.
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structure of decision theory as the organizing scaffold for this review, I
have in mind no merely mathematical quibble. As will appear, there is
much philosophy buried in the numbers.
C. Precise Numeric Assignments
Is it possible to be too precise?
Debate over the first
constraint-assignment of numeric values-was formerly the most lively
in the field of decision theory. To see why, let us examine various types
of uncertainty. In the introduction, I talked about the fact that cases in
which a lawyer will typically want to use some form of decision
methodology will be instances in which she is trying to predict unknown
future outcomes as in the settlement hypothetical. Decision theorists
define at least three different types of uncertainty which are of interest:
ignorance, risk, and ambiguity. Leaving ambiguity to the side for the
moment,21 I will concentrate on ignorance and risk. Although different
theorists interchange some terms, I will define these states as follows.'
Ignorance represents the situation in which one cannot usefully value
probabilities at all. An example of an extreme case used in one tex2
is the likelihood that the next date undertaken by a college sophomore will
spark a string of consequences ending in the children fostered by him and
his date themselves having grandchildren. Although it is certainly
possible that such a contingency will occur, its probability is not usefully
measurable.
Risk, on the other hand, in its archetypal form is the situation we
face when gambling on the roll of a "fair" die or the toss of a "fair"
coin.' We do not know what the particular result of that toss will be;
our money is at risk. But we do know,' however, the long term odds
21.
See infra Section II.D.
22.
The authors on decision theory each tend to label these divisions slightly
differently. Theorists like Raiffa tend to lump all lack of information into one category
which he labels "uncertainty" in RAIFFA, supra note 8, at 104-27, and "risk" in R.
DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND
CRITICAL SURVEY 13 (1957) [hereinafter GAMES]. To complicate matters, in the earlier
work he calls by the name "uncertainty" what I refer to here as ignorance. Resnik's very
helpful philosophical work, MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCrION TO
DECISION THEORY 13-17 (1987), uses the terminology that I have adopted. See also
SMrrTsON, supra note 13, at 9 (offering the most extensive taxonomy, which names risk

as a species of uncertainty).
23.
RESNIK, supra note 22, at 13.
24.
A "fair" coin, by definition, has an equal likelihood of falling on either side;
the same holds to a "fair" die.
25.
Actually there is no way of knowing, in the sense of a deductively certain
rule, that the probability of an apparently "fair" coin is congruent with the observed long
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of such an undertaking (1/6 for any particular side of the die, 1/2 for each
side of the coin). Making probability judgments in these circumstances
is not difficult. These judgments based upon known data are called
frequency judgments. If, for example, the lawyer knew that in cases such
as the plaintiffs', juries in her county had awarded $1,000,000 in 65% of
all cases tried within the last two years, she would be justified on a
frequency basis in concluding that she should assign a probability of .65
to the $1,000,000 verdict option instead of the .55 she assigned in the
hypothetical. There are now services that collect and publish such
data,'S but a purely frequency solution to problems of choice will never
be totally available to lawyers. There will always be the problems of
defining similar cases from similar jurisdictions with similar juries. In all
but the very largest jurisdictions, sample sizes will almost always be too
small for accuracy.'
terms odds. It is possible that people have not been watching long enough, although this
seems unlikely considering the extent of human history with gambling, coins and dice.
For discussion of the interrelationship of probability theory and gambling, with emphasis
on the late development of the theory given the long prior history of gaming, see IAN
HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS
-ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE 1-11 (1975). It is also
possible that the physical laws on which these observations depend will at some point in
the future change, but if this were to occur, I would suggest that it would focus mankind's
attention on issues other than the implications for decision theory. The only way to arrive
at this result deductively is to a priori define a coin as "fair." That can happen, of
course, only in theory. See discussion of induction and deduction infra Section III.A.
26.
See JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION
HANDBOOKS.

27.
Sample size is an important determinant of accuracy. Many cases are
necessary before samples reliably reflect the populations from which they are drawn. A
one hundred fold increase in sample size will be necessary to obtain a ten fold increase
in accuracy. See RUSSELL LANGLEY, PRACTICAL STATISTICS SIMPLY EXPLAINED 45-47
(Rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter PRACTICAL STATISTICS]. People in general and even those
with statistical training have a poor practical appreciation for the fact. RICHARD NISBETr
& LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 77-82 (1980) [hereinafter HUMAN INFERENCE]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 430-54 (1972), edited and reprinted in DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL.,
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 38-46 (1982) [hereinafter
HEURISTICS]. See also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Belief in the Law of Small
Numbers, 76 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 105-10 (1971), reprinted in HEURISTICS, supra,
at 23-31. Judgments based on small samples must be treated with extreme caution.
On the other hand, linear models (i.e., mechanical predictions based upon precise
inputs) have outperformed ad hoc judgments in many prediction tasks; so some data, even
if flawed, may be of value here. See Robyn M. Dawes & Bernard Corrigan, Linear
Models in Decision Making, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 95-106 (1974); Robyn M.
Dawes, The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models of Decision Making, in
HEURISTICS, supra, at 391-407.
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Until the 1930s, those advocating the use of decision theory only in
instances in which frequency data were available were in the
ascendancy,' but at least since the publication of Truth and Probability
by Frank Ramsey," another school has emerged, and it has held sway
in the field of decision theory since the 1950s. Subjectivists or
Bayesians,' as they are known, are disinclined to exclude problems
from decision theory no matter how sparse the data upon which
probability judgments are predicated. Their belief is that better decisions
eventuate if, even in the face of what many would call ignorance, one
makes a best guess at what the probabilities might be. 1 The Bayesian
position is that these statements of probabilities are statements about
degrees of belief and therefore can legitimately be subjective in nature.
Being taken with the rationality imposed by decision theory, they are
loath to let its use gravel for want of matter. Further, through the use of
Bayes's Theorem (discussed below), they maintain that original subjective
judgments are subject to correction through the accumulation of
subsequent data. If most lawyers are to use decision theory, their prior
probabilities will almost always have to be of a Bayesian sort.
Since, for subjectivists, probabilities are expressions of degrees of
belief, it will surely be possible for the lawyer to assign these numerical
probabilities to the contingencies of the trial. When asked, as I suggested

Ross and Nisbett also indicate that sample size problems seldom have devastating
impacts in real life modeling problems because even small samples tend to mirror the
scatter characteristics of the population from which they are drawn. See HUMAN
INFERENCE, supra, at 256-60.
28.
In fact, many would have rejected most of what we call frequency data. See
Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, in RATIONALITY IN ACTION:
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 87, 89-92 (Paul K. Moser ed., 1990) [hereinafter
RATIONALITY].

Frank P. Ramsey, Truth and Probability, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF
Leonard J.
Savage formalized the Bayesian school with the publication of his axioms in LEONARD J.
SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1972). For a brief history, see PRESS, supra
note 9, at 8-18; see also SMITHSON, supra note 13, at 58-69, and RAIFFA, supra note 8,
at 273-88.
30.
Named after the Reverend Thomas Bayes, an 18th century clergyman, whose
treatise, An Essay Toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, was sent
posthumously to the Royal Society by his executor in 1763. This essay sets forth Bayes's
theorem, which provides a method to adjust the prior probabilities in light of new data and
then render in mathematical form one of the processes of induction. See infra. section
II.E. For a historical sketch of Bayes by G.A. Barnard and a reprint of the essay, see
PRESS, supra note 9, at 181-217.
See RAIFFA, supra note 8, at 104-28, 154-56; see also GAMES, supranote 22,
31.
at 275-306.
29.

MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL ESSAYS (R.B. Braithwaite ed., 1931).
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above,' "Where do you get these numbers?" a good Bayesian feels no
compunction in saying, "Out of my head." But what if the lawyer is less
convinced and is reluctant to assign precise values? The Bayesians would
assert that she must do so if she seeks to be rational." Bayesians would
tolerate sensitivity testing of the result to changes in the assignments.
Sensitivity testing involves making small changes in assigned values and
noting the effect of those changes on the final result. In the example, if
the lawyer did this sensitivity testing, she would find that if she altered
all the assignments by decreasing the value of the most likely outcome by
.05, the result would drop the expected overall outcome to $707,040.
Since that value is lower than the settlement offer of $800,000, she might
well want to rethink her assignments. 5 But as the next section reveals,
she must use these tests only to refine her assignments, not to avoid the
assignment requirement.
. D. Cover All Options
Is it possible to foresee all the contingencies? The second technical
requirement of decision theory is that all assigned probabilities must be
mutually exclusive and must sum to one. 6 That is,
P(X) + P(X) + P(X) + ... P(x

= 1.

These requirements make sense when you realize that "one" is the
equivalent of certainty in this system. If "one" represents certainty, then
any combination of uncertain outcomes which together describe all
possibilities inherent in the situation must by definition add to this
certainty. It is a necessary artifact of the definitions of the system that
this be so as long as the probabilities do not overlap.
There are three necessary, but not self-evident, corollaries which
result from this definition. The first of these is that the probability of an
32.
See supra text following note 14.
33.
Raiffa discusses an example in which the evaluator has only a brief glimpse
of physical objects and is, on the basis of this impressionistic information, asked to assign
them by percentage to categories. He classifies this condition of very limited information
as objective vagueness and asserts that one should assign probabilities as if one were
dealing with event uncertainty. RAIFFA, supra note 8, at 104-08. Note also his further
discussion of methods for dealing with this "vagueness." Id. at 157-79. See YATES,
supra note 8, at 31-32 for a pithy statement of the problem. See GAMES, supra note 22,
at ch. 13.
34.
See SMrrH, supra note 9, at 52, 63; RAIFA, supra note 8, at 140-41.
35.
Compare with result supra text accompanying note 19.
36.
See RAIFFA, supra note 8, at 110-16.
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event and the probability that that event will not occur must also sum to
one. Let me illustrate with an example in which the only issue is whether
some event-e.g., granting of a directed verdict-will or will not occur.
This is written:

P(X) + P(X) = 1.
Again this result follows from the definitions above; if an event and its
complement are the only two possible results then one or the other of
them must surely happen, and the sum of their likelihoods must be
certainty. Few of us would be disturbed at all by this result in situations
such as directed verdict or no directed verdict, because we are quite sure
that P(X) and P(X) really do exhaust the options. Either there will, at
some point in the trial, be a directed verdict or there won't. But what
about situations in which we are not so sure what the options are? I think
it helps one accept the Bayesian construct here to think of P(X) not as "no
directed verdict," but rather as "none of the above." This definition
leaves open the option that something which you had not contemplated at
all will occur. An example of such an unforseen contingency might be
loss of sufficient jurors from the venire during trial that a mistrial would
take the case from the jury.
The utility of this definition appears more intuitively in the multiple
option situation. For this purpose look at the damages node of the
hypothetical. In describing the situation above, for the sake of simplicity,
I had the lawyer assign probabilities to fixed dollar amounts which
summed to one." This approach makes the math straight forward, as
each probability can be multiplied by a fixed sum. But in the real world
most lawyers would be disinclined to be certain that they could isolate all
of the likely jury verdicts. The lawyer would almost certainly prefer to
set aside some percentage of the available probability against the
contingency that the jury might come out with some unexpected result; in
effect to assign some probability to "none of the above." The problem,
of course, is how to determine the value of this probability. Since the
value is by definition unknown, it can only be approximated. Various
averaging techniques suggest themselves, such as taking the mean or
median of the range within which the lawyer feels the unknown verdict
37.

It should be evident that by having all probabilities sum to one, the system

preserves the rule of complements adding to one which we identified above. P(XI) +
(P(X2) + P(X3) + ... P(X,)) = 1 is the same as P(X) + P(X) = 1 because by definition
since each probability is mutually exclusive (P(X 2) + P(X3) + ... P(X,)) = P(X).

1992:1847
may fall."

Lawyer Decision Making

1865

However, aside from the valuation problem, there is no

major intuitive hurdle to cross in setting aside some fixed portion of the
available probability to cover the contingency that some unexpected event

will occur.
The third and thorniest corollary of the additivity requirement is that
all kinds of unsureness about the likely results can properly be treated as
if one were assigning probability to an unknown event, contingency, or
risk. In the section above, the theory required the lawyer to assign
precise probabilities. Here she is required to assign full weight to those
probabilities. She is not permitted to say, "I think the liability likelihood
is .85, but since it's only a hunch, I would like to assign .80 and leave
.05 as an unassigned fudge factor."" Or to take another kind of
unsureness, if the case contained a prayer for injunctive relief the lawyer
might say, "I am 95% sure that we will get the injunction, but the
wording thereof will be critical to enforcement, and therefore, I won't be
able to say whether we have real relief until I actually see it."'
These various kinds of unsureness have been defined in the literature
as "ambiguity," "vagueness," "fuzziness," etc.41 I will use the term
"ambiguity" generally to define both these and other situations in which

something other than the occurrence of the event is in question.
Bayesians are quite insistent that cases of ambiguity should all be treated

as if they were forms of risk which should be factored into the basic
probability calculations. 42 In the view of the Bayesians, the only issue
38.
For example, if the lawyer were to conclude that there was a .05 chance of,
a verdict less than $500,000 but greater than $100,000, she might choose to assign this
probability an overall value of $300,000, which is the arithmetic mean or average of the
range $500,000 > Range > $100,000. The value of this probability then would be .05
* $300,000, or $15,000.
39.
For a mathematical decision theorist who does permit the reservation of
unassigned probability, see GLENN SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE
5-6 (1976) [hereinafter EVIDENCE].
40.
Smithson gives the example of an evaluator who is quite sure of what he calls
a "fuzzy" event. "Right now we have light to moderate drizzle." SMrrHSON, supra note
13, at 94-99. He points out that advanced mathematical models are being developed in
an attempt to deal with this "fuzziness." Id.
41.
See SMITHSON, supra note 13, at 9, for detailed taxonomy of the general
category that the author labels "uncertainty."
42.
See RAIFFA, supra note 8, at 107:
In summary: The probability that the unknown urn is a 01, denoted by P(81),
is clearly .8 in the original problem [when the observer knew the proportions],
and it still ought to be .8 for Variation I [where only impressionistic
information is available]; also, mathematically speaking, .8 is .8 is .8
is .... and it's of no avail to say that one .8 is fuzzier than another .8.
See also D.V. Lindley, The Probability Approach to the Treatment of Uncertainty
in Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, 2 STATISTICAL SCI. 17, 24 (1987):
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is to get the decision maker to assign crisp probabilities in the face of the
vagueness or ambiguity inherent in the situation. They offer a variety of
methods, the roots of which involve comparison of the decision maker's
vague probabilities to known lotteries.'
Two objections to this position are worth noting. First, where the
effects of "ambiguity" on subjects have been tested, it is quite clear that

people treat ambiguous problems differently from those involving the
mere uncertainty or randomness." Secondly, new mathematical models
which attempt to deal with these distinctions are under development. The

one drawing the widest public attention at the moment is "fuzzy set"
theory. That theory rejects the notion required by probability theory that
options are mutually exclusive. The classic example is the class of "tall"

people. A person 5'11" might have some membership in this class, but
might also have membership as well in the class of "middle sized"
people. Many qualities, including the effectiveness of an injunction, are
hard to define in static categories. By permitting these flexible
assignments and using a variety of mathematical techniques to manipulate
the resulting groupings, "fuzzy set" theory attempts to model more
closely the realities of natural language use and human thought

processes.'

It is beyond my task here to value the claims of these

"[Probability is the only sensible description of uncertainty and is adequate for all
problems involving uncertainty. All other methods are inadequate."
43.
For a description, see RAIFFA, supra note 8, at 108-10, 161-65; see also
SMITH, supra note 9, at 41-61.
44.
The clearest example is the "Ellsberg Paradox." For Ellsberg's original
discussion, see Ellsberg, supra note 28, at 89-112. Essentially, people asked to assign a
probability to an ambiguous choice between two lotteries will assign a .5 probability to
each in the absence of any information. This is consistent with the "principle of
insufficient reason," which captures the intuitive sense that when people have no basis to
discriminate between two selections, they will, and some say should, assign equal
likelihoods to each. RESNIK, supra note 22, at 35-37. But when given a choice between
these lotteries and one with a known probability of .5, they uniformly choose the known
value. Ellsberg contends that people making these judgments are behaving rationally to
protect themselves against unknown downside risks. Ellsberg, supra note 28, at 104-06.
For examples of ambiguity effects in the selection of medical treatments, see Shawn
P. Curley et al., An Investigation of Patients' Reactions to Therapeutic Uncertainty, 4
MED. DECISION MAKINO 501 (1984); Shawn P. Curley et al., PsychologicalSources of
Ambiguity Avoidance, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230
(1986).
45.
On fuzzy set theory, see BART KOSKO, NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY
SYSTEMS (1992); L.A. Zadch, Fuzzy Sets, 8 INFO. CONTROL, 338 (1965) (by the father
of fuzzy set theory). For a brief overview, see SMITHSON, supra note 13, 108-18.
Attention also needs to be paid to EVIDENCE, supra note 39.
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models to achieve the descriptive power that they aLsert,' but rejection
of these models in their early stages seems short-sighted.47
All of these alternate models share the property of being sub-additive
with respect to probability assignments." That is, the probabilities
assigned to known contingencies do not sum to "one." Again, given their
premises this makes sense. If not all unsureness is defined by event
uncertainty or risk, then certainty or "one" is not to be found simply by
adding together these event probabilities. Some measure of uncertainty
must be left for the other sources of ambiguity. See Figure 6. (Black
areas indicate unambiguous probability; grey areas indicate areas that subadditive theorist would leave unassigned but Bayesians require be included
in probability assignments.) Acceptance of the decision theory model,
which normatively requires that all uncertainty be grouped together,
explicitly rejects these alternate views.

Figure 6

46.
However, the first generally accessible fuzzy set software shell has just been
released, so study of those claims may not be that far away. See CubiCalk by
HyperLogic.
47.
Smithson suggests the possible emergence of a paradigm shift in decision
theory. SMITHSON, supra note 13, at 145-51.
48.
See, e.g., SMrrHSON, supra note 13, at 120, 124, 128.
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E. Reduction through Combination
Is there a satisfactory way to combine probabilities? In the example,
the lawyer wanted to know the combined effect of getting to the jury,
winning on the issue of liability, and achieving a particular verdict. The
final assumption of the basic decision theory model is that the
combination of probabilities is multiplicative. This assumption needs a
little translation. As the example above showed, the lawyer predicted that
there would be no directed verdict (P(J.,) = .95) and that then there
would be a verdict in favor of her client on liability (P(L
1buy) = .85).
If an event cannot occur unless another precedes or accompanies it, then
that event is "dependent." For the case to reach the point. at which
damages are determined, both of these acts are required: the independent
ruling of no directed verdict and the dependent finding of liability. The
lawyer needs to be able to determine what the chances are that both will
occur. There must be some way to combine them and figure out the joint
probability.
The easiest way to see the appropriate answer is to use what is called
a Venn diagram."9 See Figure 7. The lawyer is interested in the area
in which the two events overlap, the area shaded in gray. It is evident
from this diagram that the area of overlap is smaller than or equal to that
occupied by the smaller of the two events.') The chance of having no
49.
Such diagrams are named for their developer, John Venn, an English logician
who lived from 1834 to 1923.
50.
People routinely behave, in some situations, as if joint probabilities are in fact
larger than they are. See, for example, one of a series of studies on this issue, by
Tversky and Kahneman in which subjects in 1980 were asked to rank order the likelihood
of four events or combinations of events.
Suppose Bjorn Borg reaches the Wimbledon fimals in 1981. Please rank order
the following outcomes from most to least likely.
1
Borg will win the match.
2
Borg will lose the first set
3
Borg will win the first set, but lose the match.
4
Borg will lose the first set, but win the match.
The answers they received rated option one (1) as the most likely followed by option four
(4), option two (2) and then three (3). The rating of option four (4) as more likely than
option two (2) violates the rule that compound probabilities must be smaller than or equal
to the smallest of the probabilities being combined. Tversky and Kahneman ascribe this
effect to the construction of imaginative scenarios which are then used to predict
outcomes. Example subjects found it easier to envision a scenario which involved Borg's
ultimate triumph rather than one that involved a simple loss. Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgments of andby Representativeness,in HEURISTICS, supranote 27, at 84,
96. The authors of HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 27, at 115-122, link this scenario
building with causal attribution, which raises issues that I will discuss below. See infra
Part IV.
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Figure 7
directed verdict and a finding of liability cannot be larger than the chance
of having a finding of liability alone. Therefore, what is needed is a
system that will account for the uncertainty of the two figures and will
result in a smaller product than would be produced by the jury verdict
area alone. It is a property of the multiplication of numbers less than one
that the product is a number smaller than those multiplied. Here the joint
probability of both getting to the jury and having the jury find liability is
P(JY) * P(Ljbmw[J.Y) = P(J & Lbit). In the example, .95 * .85 =
.8075.
This property works very nicely in terms of describing joint
probabilities, but it has an unfortunate side effect for the legal use of
probability theory. As pointed out by L. Jonathan Cohen in The Probable
and the Provable,application of this principle renders it all but impossible
to prove a complex case.51 How can a mere arithmetic manipulation
have such untoward effect?
51.
L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 58-67 (1977).
As with many of Cohen's points, he states his legal premises a little more dogmatically
then is justified, but his fundamental complaint here is sound. He seems to maintain that
the number of issues in a case should not have any effect on the difficulty of proof,
which, as a practical matter, is to claim too much. But he is surely right that the number
of issues should not make proof impossible.
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To reach a conclusion of liability in a civil case or for guilt in a
criminal matter, the fact finder must conclude that each element of the
various causes of action is proved to the requisite degree of legal certainty
(preponderance, beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.). Further, Cohen argues
persuasively that the entire case must be in some way convincing." But
let me assume that the plaintiff proves each element in even a simple
negligence case by a probability of .52. Thus, the plaintiff convinces the
jury that the defendant owed a duty of care (P(D,,) = .52), that the
defendant breached that duty (P(B., = .52), that the breach caused
injury to the plaintiff (P(C 8 .) = .52) and that the plaintiff was damaged
thereby (P($&,.) = .52). The jury's job under decision theory is now
to determine the joint probabilities to determine whether the plaintiff has
proved his case on liability. But we know from the rule requiring
multiplication that the joint probability here would be (P(Du,) * P(Bh
* P(C J ) * P($,

,,) = P(L,bu). And .52 * .52 * .52 * .52 = .073.

Therefore, although the plaintiff has proved each element by more than
a preponderance, he has, under the rules of conjunction, totally failed to
state a case which should convince the jury overall.' If one may freely
assume higher quanta of persuasion on each element in the typical case so
as to push the overall probability higher, one must also allow that many
law suits involve far more elements than the simple negligence case which
I have laid out above. The result is that if our lawyer is to use
probability theory in assessing the likely case outcome, and if she
assumes that the jury will use the same reasoning process which she
employs herself,' she will inform her client that his prospects are
bleak. 5' As I will discuss below in the sections on inductive probability
52.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 66-67.
53.
The combined probability of .073 is premised on the assumption that all of
the element probabilities are independent. When this is the case, a special statement of
the conjunction rule holds that P(X,) * P(X) * ... P(X,) = P(X1 & X 2 & ... X,). This
produces the extreme result here. But even if one assumes that duty and breach are
dependent variables, we will have problems.
Using the formula for dependent
probabilities, leaving damages as independent, and finally assuming the most extreme case
in which, if duty is proven, breach and damages are certain, the following results: P(Dd
& B,,A & C. & $d,.) = P(D ,Y)* P(B,.c I D.y) * P(C.. IB,.h & D.,) * P($..)
or
P(D," & B, & C,, & $,,)
= .52 * 1 * 1 * .52 = .2704.
54.
Fortunately for her we can be quite sure they don't. See infra note 58; see
also Nancy Pennington, Causal Reasoning and Decision Making: The Case of Juror
Decisions (1981) (doctoral thesis, Harvard).
55.
Nor is this concern purely hypothetical. It appeared in reverse in the case of
People v. Collins, 438 P. 2d 33 (Cal. 1968). In Collins, the prosecutor wished to bolster
his eyewitness testimony as to the identities of two daylight robbers. An elderly woman
had been pushed to the ground in an alley and her purse was stolen. She identified her
attacker as a younger white woman with medium blonde hair. A bystander testified that,
after he heard shouts from the alley, he saw a woman, white with a dark blonde ponytail,
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run from the alley to a yellow car driven by a black man with a beard and mustache. The
defendant and his wife who generally answered the description were arrested and brought
to trial. The identification testimony was to some extent undermined on cross.
The prosecutor at that point put a professor of mathematics on the stand. The
professor explained the rule of combination through multiplication. The prosecutor, one
is tempted to say in the best Bayesian manner, provided numerical probabilities for the
various pieces of the description provided:
Yellow car
.1
Man with mustache
.25
Woman with ponytail
.1
Woman with blonde hair
.33
Negro man with beard
.1
Inter-racial couple in car
.001
Multiplying these factors together, the prosecutor got an overall likelihood of a couple
meeting these criteria as one in 12,000,000. He then argued that this probability was so
low that the defendant, who met all of these requirements, must be guilty. Collins was
convicted.
The California Supreme Court, in overturning the conviction, lodged four basic
objections. First, they showed in an appendix to the opinion that, on the prosecutor's own
figures, there were likely to be one or two other couples meeting the criteria in the
metropolitan area in which the crime occurred. They held that it was not a sufficient
ground to convict that the field of potential defendants had been narrowed to a small
group of whom the defendant was one. Next, the court pointed out the lack of any factual
basis for the prosecutor's probability assignments. They questioned the assumption that
all of the probabilities were independent, as the prosecutor's calculations had assumed.
Finally, the court worried that the jury would be dazzled by the formula and fail to realize
that they still had the obligation to weigh the credibility of the eye witness testimony to
establish whether the events had occurred as they asserted, i.e., to determine whether the
various criteria used were in fact the correct ones.
No one would, I think, challenge that if the jury was prejudiced in the sense that
they did not understand their continuing role as fact finder, then the evidence should have
been excluded. So the fourth point in the opinion is not implicated. There are those who
would contend that evidence of the size of the class of possible defendants should be
admitted.
But the points about probability assignments and independence are critical to us.
On the first, all that the prosecutor was doing was assigning his degrees of belief to the

various criteria. He invited the jury to substitute their own if they did not approve of his.
He lacked frequency data, but as we have seen that would not stop a good Bayesian for

long. Furthermore, it is not clear that his assignments were all that unreasonable. With
the possible exceptions of that assigned to the occurrence of inter-racial couples, they do
not seem unreasonable hunches to me. (Even if inter-racial couples were one in 100 (.01)
the result of the multiplication would have been one couple in 1,000,000. If one in every
ten couples were inter-racial the result would have been one in 100,000.) My guess is
that the jury would have found either of these results significant.

On the issue of independence, the only two criteria which are certainly dependent
to some degree are the man with the mustache and the negro male with a beard.
Assuming that the "man with mustache" is totally dependent on the variable "negro with
a beard", which is surely an unduly conservative assumption, the overall probabilities only
change from one in 12,000,000 to three in 12,000,000 (or three in 1,000,000 or three in
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and causal decision making, it is in part the rejection of this method of
combining probabilities which underlies alternate methods of prediction.
There is a further byproduct of the rule of multiplicative conjunction.
In addition to sanctioning the use of subjective probability judgments, the
peculiarly Bayesian contribution to decision theory is the use of Bayes's
Theorem itself.' That theorem provides a means of adjusting a prior
hypothesis or base rate information in light of new data. As such it is of
high interest to legal decision makers because it permits the adjustment of
likelihood judgments to accommodate new evidence. The theorem is a
specialized application of the multiplication rules set forth above.57
100,000, if the jury made the adjustments suggested in the paragraph above.) Again the
resulting change is not likely to sway the weight given this evidence by the jury.
My point is not that the prosecutor was correct in his approach or that the court was
wrong, but rather that cleaning up the math would not solve the root problem. It is
inherent in the rule of multiplication that the number of the criteria unduly influence the
result. Put together enough criteria-whether they be elements in a cause of action or
features of an identification-and the probabilities shrink alarmingly. Had defense counsel
been mathematically alert he would have countered by embracing the prosecutor's
suggestion and proceeding as follows:
Members of the jury, the prosecutor has shown you that you should multiply
your degrees of belief in the sub-elements of a proposition to determine the
believability of the whole. Here the prosecution wants you to conclude that
my client is guilty. To do that, he needs to convince you 1) that a crime
occurred in this state, 2) that the indictment of the defendant occurred within
the statute of limitations, 3) that that crime involved the taking of property,
4) from the person or control of another, 5) without the permission of the
possessor, 6) that force or threat of force was used in the taking, 7) that the
thing taken was of value, and 8) that the defendant did the taking (the classic
elements of a robbery charge). If we assume that the prosecutor has
convinced you of each of these points so that you would assign a .9
probability of each, all that remains is that we multiply them together. .9 *
.9 * .9 *.9 *.9 * .9 * .9 * .9 = .43. So even if you are convinced of each
separate proposition, by the prosecutor's logic, you cannot be convinced of
my client's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
56.
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
57.
Bayes's Theorem holds that the probability of a new hypothesis formed after
the assimilation of new evidence should equal the ratio of the prior probability of the
initial hypothesis multiplied by the probability of the new data given that prior hypothesis
to the result of that calculation plus a complimentary calculation in which the probability
of the contradictory initial hypothesis is multiplied by the probability of the new data
given that contradictory hypothesis. This equation is written:

P(H

IH.,,) *P(Ho.)
DP(Data
Dt)=( P(Data lHod) *P(tod)) +(P(Datal-z *P(-ffH

The denominator can be understood as a statement of the impact of the initial
hypothesis and its compliment on the total probability of the new data. To see this,
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There is very substantial evidence that people do not use anything
consult the Venn diagram below. For the most straight forward discussion of the theorem
that I have encountered, including this Venn diagram, see YATES, supra note 8, at 134-36.

To illustrate its application, imagine a juror in a criminal case. Before the defendant
takes the stand, this juror's prior probability judgment as to the defendant's guilt was. 10.
(See infra text accompanying note 62 as to why the prior probability must be greater than
zero.) However, when the defendant takes the stand, the juror notes that he has "shifty
eyes." Now this juror, as do many in our culture, believes he has good reason to
conclude that the probability of "shifty eyes" given guilt is .60; that is 60% of guilty
people have "shifty eyes." When pressed, our juror will concede that a few not guilty
people also have 'shifty eyes," but the juror believes that this fraction is small, perhaps
.10. Given these data and these beliefs about the incidence of "shifty eyed" people, what
the juror wants to know is how he should adjust his prior probability of guilt. Bayes's
Theorem would produce the following conclusion:

P(G ISE

=

P(SE,. IGum) *P(G )
(P(SE,. IGil) *P(G.,)) +(P(SE. IUD,~ *P(Gd&))

p(G,,ISE,)

=

.60*.10
(.60,.10)+(.10,.90)

+.06
.t
.06+.09

P(G,,ISE,,)=.4 or 40%

1874

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

approximating Bayes's theorem in their every day calculations."8 And

there is some evidence that if used on intricate problems its mathematics
becomes unmanageable.'

But it does provide a consistent model for

evaluating evidence and one which can be made accessible through the
use of appropriate software.'
However, L. Jonathan Cohen points out that it does have a
significant flaw which normatively precludes its use by judges or juries
in testing the hypothesis of guilt or liability. 1 Because the theorem
relies on multiplication, it requires that the initial hypothesis of guilt or

liability be non-zero. The criminal law is the easiest case for the
problem. There is a presumption in Anglo-American law that the
defendant is innocent. This presumption continues throughout the trial
and has its effect at the end when the prosecution must overcome this
presumption to obtain a conviction.'
Therefore, we instruct the jury
that they must begin the trial with the belief that the defendant is
innocent. This would translate into an assignment of zero (0) probability
to guilt. But if all other evidence in the trial is combined through
repeated use of Bayes's theorem to update the hypothesis, the outcome
58.
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of
Prediction, originally published in 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237 (1973), and reprinted in
HEURISTICS, supra note 27, at 48, 53-57; see also HUMAN INFERENCE, supranote 27, at
141-50, 156-60 (reporting on studies by the authors and by Kahneman & Tversky among
others); YATES, supra note 8, at 208-10 (reporting other studies). Hogarth sets forth the
classic blue cab problem in which subjects routinely neglect prior probabilities in the form
of "base rate" data in favor of admittedly flawed eye witness testimony. HOGARTH, supra
note 13, at 42-45. It is not at all clear to me that people are behaving contrary to
rationality in making these choices, as the probability theorists contend. It seems much
more likely to me that they simply don't know how to do the relevant calculations. But
in any case, it is surely proven beyond question that for whatever reason, people don't use
Bayes's Theorem or anything approaching it in everyday evaluations.
59.
The assumption that all prior probabilities and conditional probabilities are or
can be made reliably available is probably wrong. See YuN PEN & JAMES A. REGGIA,
ABDUCIIVE INFERENCE MODELS FOR DIAGNOSTIC PROBLEM SOLVING 14-15 (1990)
[hereinafter ABDUCTIVE]. See also SMITHSON, supra note 13, at 98-99, and Edward H.
Shortliffe & Bruce G. Buchanan, A Model of Inexact Reasoning in Medicine, 23
MATHEMATICAL BIoSCIENcES 351 (1975).

60.
61.
62.

See PRESS, supra note 9, at 85-100 for a partial list.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 107-13.
Let me hasten to say this is not a factual presumption, but rather an

assignment of the burden of persuasion.

See 2 JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET AL.,

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (4th ed. 1992). One intent on preserving Bayes's
Theorem in this application might finesse the problem by saying one does not have to
factor the presumption in with other proof, but to do so would clearly undermine what we
think we are doing. If one does not use the presumption, from what basis should one
begin the calculation?
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will always be zero. Mathematically any number multiplied by zero is
zero.
The fact that the theorem cannot be used by courts to determine guilt
or liability does not, of course, preclude its use by courts or by lawyers
for other purposes, but the counter-intuitive nature of some of these
conclusions serve, at least, to give me pause.

F. Summary
Decision theory is designed to evaluate rival courses of action. It
relies on the ability of its practitioners to assign discrete probabilities to
It insists that those probabilities describe all possible
events.
contingencies. That is, it requires that the probabilities sum to "one"
which connotes total certainty in the probability calculus. Finally, it
decrees that the probability of multiple events will be smaller than or at
most equal to the probability of the least probable event in the
combination.
I will show below that both of the other models of decision
making-inductive probability and causal explanation-reject these core
hypotheses. Neither of them requires precise probability assignments,
thus admitting a degree of uncertainty (ambiguity, ignorance, vagueness,
etc.) into judgments which the decision theorists find intolerable. Neither
draws the comfortable conclusion that its system necessarily covers all
Finally, neither inductive probability nor causal
contingencies.
explanation adopts decision theory's handling of multiple events. As I
explicate those theories below, the significance'of these disagreements will
emerge starkly.
III. INDUCTIVEI PROBABILITY

A. Induction Defined
Most judgments under decision theory are inductive in nature.'
That is, the practitioner reasons from the characteristics of the available
information to some conclusion about the underlying reality which the
data reflect. The Concise Oxford Dictionarydefines induction in logic as,
"the inference of a general law from particular instances."6" Perhaps the
63.
The exceptions come in games of chance with "fair" coins or dice. In those
instances, it is possible to work out the odds a priori from the definitions of the game.
See L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND

PRoBABILITY 15 (1989) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCrIONJ.
64.
THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 603 (1990)
[hereinafter OXFORD].
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most recent memorable appeal to induction occurred during the 1989
confirmation hearings of Richard Darman as Office of Management and
Budget Director. Mr. Darman advanced the test to be used to determine
whether a proposed scheme was a tax which the administration would
oppose. He said, "If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks
like a duck, it is a duck."'
All induction proceeds on this sort of premise; evidence from the
environment reflects more or less clearly the underlying laws which
control that environment. One attempts to extrapolate from that evidence
to discern the laws.' Classic decision theory is inductive because the
decision maker uses the information available (be that information
frequency data or whatever contributes to her hunch)' to predict likely
states of the world at some future time."
For much of the last twenty years,' inductive thinking in decision
making was synonymous with probability based decision theory: the
method discussed above. Recently, competitive notions of choice and
decision have begun to surface. I will discuss these notions in this section
under the heading of inductive probability. It is particularly interesting
to me that these notions are coming from two very different sources:
philosophers of science and cognitive psychologists engaged in the study
of artificial intelligence.'
First, briefly, I will make explicit the critique of decision theory
contained in this model. Then I will explore at more length the
65.
Transcript from the tape of Darman's confirmation hearings held January 19,
1989 and played on the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Nexis, Mar. 17, 1989.
66.
See JOHN H. HOLLAND ET AL., INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE,
LEARNINO, AND DISCOVERY 1-3 (1989).
67.
Under some decision approaches, the decision maker may not be conscious
of what factors influences her hunch. Her thought process is a 'black box." See Isaac
Levi, SelfProfile by IsaacLevi, in HENRY E. KYBERO, JR. & ISAAC LEVI 181,202 (Radu
J. Bogdan ed., 1982) [hereinafter Levi Portrait]. A decision maker may be able to
identify some or all of the influences affecting her choice, but the failure to identify these
influences does not automatically discredit her choice. Adopting this approach makes
accepting a choice easier, but also robs it of its justification for others.
68.
Unknown states of nature-i.e., how the relevant piece of the world is or will
be at some relevant time be-are referred to in decision theory as 0,theta.
69.
As ]an Hacking points out in his fascinating intellectual history of the early
developments of probability theory, this dominance is a recurrent pattern in decision
thinking. HACKINO, supra note 25, at 14-16.
70.
For example, see Levi Portrait,supra note 67; HOLLAND ET AL., supranote
66; PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION, supra note 63; ISAAC LEVI, THE ENTERPRISE OF
KNOWLEDOE (1980)[hereinafter LEVI: KNOWLEDGE]; L. JONATHAN COHEN & MARY
HESSE,

APPLICATIONS

OF

INDUCTIVE

Locic

(1980)

[hereinafter

APPLICATIONS

CONFERENCE]; and JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

(3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter COoNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY].
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contribution of inductive thinking to extrapolation from prior experience
to solutions for new sorts of problems.
B. The Inductive or 'Baconian" Critique of Decision Theory
L. Jonathan Cohen points out in The Probable and the Provable"
and Hacking established historically72 that it is not necessary to use the

tools appropriate to the analysis of games of chance in the study of less
structured, real world uncertainty.' Cohen, who labels his inductive
methods "Baconian" after Francis Bacon, is not the only theorist to raise
these issues,' but I will use his work to illustrate the point. It is true

that use of these tools when faced with uncertainty provides a precise and
rational predictive method, but it is Cohen's premise that this rationality

comes at too high a price. It requires that the practitioner claim a degree
of assurance which she may not possess, 75 and it deflates the probability
of the conjunction of independent events. 6 Cohen is concerned with
these problems, not in the abstract, but because he believes that they make

decision theory a poor tool for either scientific development or legal
analysis.'
It helps to see the argument if I mix the critique with the alternative.
Cohen's objection to the additivity requirement of decision theory is that

71.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 2-3.
HACKING, supra note 25, at 11-17.
72.
73.
Hacking lays out the interconnections of people and ideas which initially gave
rise to the theory. HACKING, supra note 25, at 57-72. Cohen calls these tools "Pascalian
probability" after Blaise Pascal, the theorist generally credited with the original
development of the probability calculus. Cohen refers to his own system as "Baconian"
after Francis Bacon, the English lawyer and inductive philosopher. COHEN, supra note
51, at 43.
74.
For example, see LEVI: KNOWLEDGE, supra note 70, at 89-98; Levi Portrait,
supra note 67, at 202-05; and EVIDENCE, supra note 39.
75.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 47, 81, 310-12; Isaac Levi captures the problem
in his essay Potential Surprise: Its Role in Inference and Decision Making [hereinafter
PotentialSurprise], in APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 70, at 3:
In presystematic discourse, to say that X believes that h to a positive degree
is to assert that X believes that h. To claim that X disbelieves that h to a
positive degree implies that X disbelieves that h (i.e., believes h). Finally,
when X believes that h to a 0 degree and disbelieves that h to a 0 degree, he
suspends judgement [sic] as to the truth of h.
The problem with Bayesian probability is that there is no way adequately to express
suspended judgment because of the requirement that probabilities be additive and
complimentary. See discussion supra Sections II.C & D.
76.
See discussion supra Section II.E.
77.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 49-120; PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION, supranote 63,
at 1-12.
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it uses the wrong definition of uncertainty. In the closed universe of
mathematical probability, if one does not totally believe in the truth of a
proposition P, one perforce assigns that uncertainty to a belief in the
converse propositionP. Thus if one were so unwise as to say, "I only
believe in leprechauns .1," one has effectively said, "I believe in no
leprechauns .9." Cohen points out another option.' One could say, "I
lack sufficient information to believe in leprechauns more than. 1, but for
the same reason I lack sufficient information to believe in no leprechauns
.1 also. I just don't know." So while in mathematical probability zero
(0) equals absolute disbelief in a proposition and conversely absolute
belief in its negation, in Cohen's system zero (0) means insufficient
information to believe anything, either the proposition or its converse."
It is easy to see how this judgment fits much more easily into
scientific investigation and legal analysis. To say that one does not have
enough information to evaluate the theory of relativity is not to say that
one disbelieves that theory entirely. To say that one begins a civil trial
with an open mind, ascribing zero belief to either side, is possible under
Cohen's system but not in mathematical probability-a seemingly
modest proposal. But once one gives up the closed universe of
mathematical probability in which one believes either in proposition P or
"none of the above," the entire decision calculus flies apart. For it is no
longer possible to predict outcomes when the total probability assigned at
any level of the decision tree need not sum to one. There will always be
78.
Cohen is not so frivolous as to use leprechauns in his example, but you get
the point.
79.
Among the non-Bayesians, there is debate about whether lack of acceptance
should be described as zero (0) belief as Isaac Levi sets forth in Potential Surprise, supra
note 75, at 3, or whether, as Glenn Shafer holds in EVIDENCE, supra note 39, at 84-85,
a belief that is not accepted may nevertheless accrue positive support. Cohen straddles
these two positions. He allows a proposition that subsequently has been falsified by a
later test (and thus presumably not accepted, at least in the later instance) to nevertheless
retain its support from previous tests that it has passed, but his negation principle decrees
that, on the most recent test, if support for the hypothesis on the present evidence is
positive (s[H IEl > 0/n), then support for the complement (H) is driven to zero (0) and thus
(s[l-II
EI=0/n). CoHEN, supra not 51, at 133, 177. This result is not quite as perplexing
as it seems. The distinction lies between managing notions of past and present support.
80.
A state of equipoise in mathematical probability is expressed by assigning an
hypothesis and its negation each a probability of .5, so it might be possible (though
counter-intuitive) to finesse the situation of equal balance in this matter. See CMG
Ockelton, The Use ofMathematical Probabilityin Assessing Corroborativeor Convergent
Testimonies, 24 RATIO, 61, 61-65 (1982). But that solution still leaves unaddressed the
artificial requirement of mathematical probability that a decrease in belief in H is
necessarily an increase in the belief that H is true. One might easily doubt both
propositions for lack of evidence and this state is inexpressible in mathematical
probability.
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some unknown level of unsureness built into any evaluation of the
available options.
Cohen also insists that one give up the notion that the value of a
conjunction is found by multiplying together the probability of all its
elements." Rather he substitutes the rule that a conjunction is equal to
the probability of the member with the smallest likelihood.' He defends
this decision by pointing out that if one grants belief because of the
probability of an hypothesis, then one ought to grant to a more elaborate
(conjoined) hypothesis at least the degree of belief one is prepared to give
its weakest link.
Cohen needs this proposition because it obviates the problems which
he identifies, and I discussed above, in which the combination, for
example, of elements in a legal case artificially depresses the belief which
the trier of fact is able to assign to the case as a whole.'
So at Cohen's insistence, inductive reasoning is to be stripped of two
of the important dictates of mathematical probability. One can no longer
sum all probabilities to the certainty represented by "one."
And
combinations of probabilities may no longer be smaller than either of the
two probabilities combined." The choice of theories is stark and
81.
See discussion supra Section II.E.
82.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 169, 221.
83.
See supra note 55.
84.
In the face of this evisceration of classical decision theory, is it possible to use
these concepts in anything resembling the evaluation that was the topic of the section
above? Well, yes and no.
One way to look at this problem is to say that our lawyer still knows how decision
theory would evaluate her clients' options, she is just no longer sure of her evaluations
of the odds. She could, nevertheless, chart what the outcomes would be under various
probability assumptions and then use some strategy to pick her best option given her
uncertainty. For a technical description of how this might be accomplished, see, Potential
Surprise, supra note 75, at 17-24. Should she elect to do this, non-Bayesian decision
theorists offer her a variety of tools. See RESNK, supra note 22,;at 21-45. Recall that
decision theorists recognize a state, which I referred to as ignorance, in which
probabilities cannot be effectively assigned. The lawyer is now in a similar state because
although she can assign probabilities, her assurance that she is including all the risks of
the situation has been removed. Therefore, she is not sure the probabilities she assigns
are correct. Theorists disagree about whether she should choose the option that will give
her a maximum value if the worst case happens (known as the maximin rule): here,
certainly taking the settlement. (See Potential Surprise, supra note 75, at 23. Ellsberg
indicates that decision makers in fact adopt a like strategy. ELLSBERO, supranote 28, at
110-11. Patrick Maher argues, however, that subjects who make the Allais and Ellsberg
choices make other choices that are inconsistent with Levi's theory. Patrick Maher, Levi
on the Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes, 5 ECON. & PHIL., 69, 77-78 (1989). In an
accompanying response, Levi denies that Maher's findings undermine the usefulness of
his approach in the circumstances of the Ellsberg paradox.) Or she could seek to
minimize the regret her clients would feel if they gave up a good chance at trial (known
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fundamental. Do you accept Bayesian probability with its insistence on
the assurance of a closed universe in which you either believe in
leprechauns or disbelieve? Or do you accept the notion that there is some
threshold below which evidence is so scanty that neither belief nor
unbelief are appropriate? If you fall into the Bayesian camp you are
rewarded with a workable methodology for evaluating problems under all
kinds of uncertainty, which has only one really anomalous feature in that
joint probabilities seem artificially deflated. If you prefer to retain your
agnosticism and favor a calculus like that of Cohen, you must reconcile
yourself to the fact that your judgments will be far less precise and in
some cases inconsistent.
However, the measure of the success of this alternate inductive
theory is not chiefly whether it performs the evaluation function of
classical decision theory well.' It is in solving another sort of decision
problem that inductive probability comes into its own.
C. Extrapolation
Many problems with which a lawyer deals lack the structure of
relatively clear options, which is the forte of classical decision theory.
The lawyer in grappling with these problems must extrapolate some
coherent vision of the future and make predictions based on this
extrapolation. To extrapolate in this sense is to "infer more widely from
a limited range of known facts."' It is the activity by which the lawyer
takes her base of experience and learning and uses it to structure and
draw conclusions about a previously unencountered problem. Inductive
philosophers, such as Cohen and Paul Thagard, and cognitiveF
as the minimax rule): here, perhaps arguing for taking a chance on trial. (I say perhaps
because the trial option is so close to the settlement here, and you will recall the lawyer
is now so unsure of her judgments, that it is entirely possible that the settlement might in
many instances minimize regret). Or she could adopt some variant of these. For a good
clear, non-mathematical discussion of these options, see REsNIK, supra note 22. There
are defects with all these rules in that they lead to inconsistent decisions in some
circumstances, which is why the Bayesians reject them. Other methods are under
development which may provide a way out of the morass. See supratext accompanying
notes 44-46.
85.
Cohen nowhere discusses in his books the classic decision problem of the kind
that I posited above. He even concedes in Philosophy of Induction that "Pascalian"
probability may have its uses. PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION, supra note 63, at 211.
86.
OXFORD, supra note 64, at 415.
87.
Cognitive psychology is the term self-consciously adopted to distinguish what
was, in the late 1950s, a renegade school at odds with the overwhelmingly behaviorist
emphasis of the day. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 2-11 (1990); BERNARD
J BEARS, A COONrrIVE THEORY OF CONSCIOuSNESs 7-13 (1988); COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 70, at 7-10. Behaviorists rejected the notion that one could
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psychologists, such as John Holland, Keith Holyoak and Richard
Nisbett," offer strategies for problem solution which can readily be

turned to assist the lawyer in this work."
First, let me hypothecate the kind of problem involved here. The

lawyer whom I introduced earlier confronts another decision problem.
This time she is interviewing a prospective client and is trying to decide
whether to take the case.' I will suppose that the prospective client was
injured on the job and is already receiving worker's compensation. I will

further suppose that the state in which the lawyer practices sets a very
high burden of going forward in order to reach the jury in a case where
damages over and above worker's compensation are being sought.91 In
study consciousness, preferring to treat the organism under review-either rat or man-as
a "black box" whose adaptation to the environment in terms of stimulus and response was
the proper sphere of psychological study. Behaviorists adopted this position out of despair
that an organism could provide any reliable data about the functioning of its
consciousness. Cognitivists want to study what is going on inside the mind.
88.
See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66. This book actually contains the
perspectives of both the cognitivists and the philosophers, as one of the contributors is
Paul Thagard, a philosopher with a primary interest in computational modeling of the
process of scientific discovery. The book has enjoyed general critical approval although
some reviewers have objected to a gap that occurs in spots between theory and empirical
evidence. See, Jeff Shrager, Book Review, 41 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 249 (1989);
Andrew D. Cling, Rules, Models, and Inference. A Review, 16 BEHAvIoRISM 181 (1988);
Diane F. Halpern, Book Review, 33 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. 437 (1988); K. J. Gilhooly,
Book Review, 78 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 563 (1987).
89.
I am relying on authors who do not directly address the problem I wish to
discuss. Cohen is concerned with describing scientific experimentation. Holland et al.
advance a method by which people adjust generally to the world. I am applying their
ideas in a context that they do not address. To the extent that that application does
damage to those ideas, the fault is mine, not theirs. They also do not cite each other
though both cite other inductivist thinkers, primarily those from the philosophical camp.
There is some evidence that computer modeling of induction process has come to the
attention of the philosophers. See Margaret A. Boden, Real World Reasoning, in
APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 70, at 359-75.
90.
Unlike the previous example, this is clearly the lawyer's decision so ethical
obligations to involve the prospective client do not arise.
91.
In West Virginia, a provision like the one I have in mind here is found at W.
VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (c)(2) (1985):
The immunity from suit provided under this section and under section six-a
[§23-2-6a], article two of this chapter, may be lost only if the employer or
person against whom liability is asserted acted with "deliberate intention."
This requirement may be satisfied only if:
(i) It is proved that such employer or person against whom
liability is asserted acted with a consciously, subjectively and
deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of
injury or death to an employee. This standard requires a showing
of an actual, specific intent and may not be satisfied by allegation
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this case, I will assume that the law requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the employer knowingly and intentionally put the worker in danger,
before his case will be allowed to go to the jury. The lawyer in our
hypothetical must decide whether she should attempt to make this case (on
a contingent fee) or whether she should decline representation.'
A
Bayesian would tell her to use her best judgment to assign probabilities
to the likely outcomes in the case-summary judgment, motion to dismiss,
jury verdict, etc.-do her calculations and thus control her judgment. I
think our lawyer might well be pardoned for saying that this advice is not
helpful." She would complain that even if ultimately she might be in
a position to make such a judgment, what she needs now is a
methodology for determining what factors should be included in making
her "best judgment." How should she organize her understanding of the
world so as to effectively address this problem?
The inductivists, whose views I will examine below, would suggest
that she proceed roughly as follows. First she should consider what she
knows about the context in which she is operating. She should consider
the relevant law, the attitude of her likely judge, the character of her
prospective client and opponent, her degree of skill and experience, and
any other item in the environment which she believes will shape the
decision. It is not possible to lay down non-context-sensitive rules for
what these influences might be because each context, according to these
theorists, involves different variables. Next she should attempt to isolate
from these environmental characteristics as broad a range of variables as
possible which she believes are relevant to her decision. The emphasis
here is on the breadth or the spread of the list for reasons which will
appear below. She may want to use various creativity enhancing tools at
this point to try to broaden her list. 4
Now she has her list of variables, for example: recent state supreme
court cases in the field, the political posture of her judge vis-a-vis
employees and plaintiffs, the demeanor of the prospective client, the
precise content of his testimony on this issue, the coherence of the story
or proof of (A) Conduct which produces a result that was not
specifically intended; (B) conduct which constitutes negligence, no
matter how gross or aggravated; or (C) willful, wanton or reckless
misconduct; ....
92.
In addition to the contingent fee issues, she must worry about Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or its state rule equivalent, which bars the filing of
frivolous claims.
93.
See Potential Surprise, supra note 75.
94.
See ARTHUR B. VANGUNDY, TECHNIQUES OF STRUCTURED PROBLEM
SOLVINO 40 (2d ed. 1988).
Software packages designed to promote alternative
identification include Idea Fisher (Fisher Idea Systems, Inc.) and The Idea Generator Plus
(Experience in Software, Inc.).
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he tells, the time and money she can devote to discovery, etc. Next, she
must test them mentally in progressively more complicated combinations
with the intent of finding the circumstance or combination of
circumstances that will prevent her from prosecuting this case
successfully. She will make these judgments based upon what she has
noticed about this case in comparison to other cases with which she has
experience. She is looking for instances of co-variation between the
variables in her case and those in other cases that were or were not
successful. With respect to each variable, she will insist on forming a
judgment that raises the likelihood of her conclusion above some
threshold with which she feels comfortable. She may find a new kind of
decision tree useful here. See Figure 8. It illustrates her thought process
through the first two layers of analysis. At each layer there are three
options: She can fail to test her belief that the case is tenable (represented
by the long, spindly branches on the tree);" she may test the proposition

Figure 8

95.
At any point that the lawyer neglects to examine succeeding variables, she can
conclude that her case is secure, but in doing so she is relying on a weak reed. She does
not know with certainty whether the hypothesis would have survived the tests avoided.
This state of affairs occurs most frequently, not when the lawyer deliberately declines to
test the thesis, but rather when she does not realize that additional constraints ought to be
examined.
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and find that it passes the test (here illustrated by the successful right fork
at test (tQ)); or she may test the proposition and find it wanting (here
shown by the left at (tQ)).'
If she hits a variable which she believes will prevent successful
prosecution of the case, she should examine the combination of variables
that she has constructed to see whether changing it in some believable
way will let her achieve that goal. Look in more detail at the branches
from (t2). See Figure 9. If the facts do not fit because the client
discloses items that are at odds with the needed elements (for example, if
his own negligence or misfeasance caused the injury), then the way is
blocked. But, for example, if the prospective client simply does not know
the state of mind of the employer, the variable tested can be reformulated
to permit further exploration. See test T2', Figure 9.

Client

Figure 9
Let me highlight the five critical pieces of this description: 1) context
sensitivity, 2) generation of a broad spread of relevant variables, 3)
exposure to tests with progressively greater falsifying power, 4) the use
of co-variation data, and 5) the requirement that each point reaches an
96.
See COHEN, supra note 51, at 205-07, for the decision tree schema, although
Cohen does not put it to the purpose I suggest.
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acceptance threshold before it is adopted. Each of these prescriptions
finds its equivalent in Cohen and in Holland et al.
D. Context Sensitivity
Let me begin with context sensitivity. Philosophers of science going
back at least as far as Leibniz 7 have tried to devise methods for
regularizing inductive reasoning with either the lofty goal of discovering
underlying methods that will assure correct results in all fieldse or the
more modest objective of minimizing inductive errors in the field under
study.
The popular current thinking is that the lofty goal is
unattainable.'
This belief is premised on the notion that inductive
judgments must be made in the context of the field under study. In each
field there are different sorts of problems to which different kinds of
evidence are germane. Isaac Levi in Gambling with Truthw gives the
example of a scientist noting apparent cloud formations on Mars. The
scientist would ask the source of these apparent phenomena and would
consider issues of whether they represented sand storms, some sort of
vapor, or a malfunctioning telescope. The inquiry would not extend,
however, to a re-exploration of the theory of gravity or the Copernican
model of the universe. Although both of those theories are inductively
based, they are also firmly entrenched in the field of astronomy. The
local field would, at any point in time, 1 ' treat the first set of questions
as available for study and the second as settled. This division of inquiry
into areas that are currently relevant and those that are not, is critical, for
See HACKING, supra note 25, at 134-42.
See, e.g., Richard C. Jeffrey, Carnap and Inductive Logic, in RUDOLF
CARNAP, LOGICAL EMPIRIcST 327 (Jeakko Hintikke ed., 1975).
Camap tried to
construct a universal function which would relate evidence to hypothesis and tell a
decision maker what degree of belief or credence he ought to have in the hypothesis,
given the evidence.
99.
See Jeffrey, supra note 98, at 327; HACKING, supranote 25, at 134-42; Levi
Portrait,supra note 67, at 188; Jonathan E. Adler, Criteriafor a Good Inductive Logic,
in APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 70, at 390 n.43; COHEN, supra note 51, at 2425; PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION, supra note 63, at 126-30; HOLLAND ET AL., supra note
66, at 6-7.
100.
ISAAC LEVI, GAMBLING WITH TRUTH: AN ESSAY ON INDUCTION AND THE
AIMs OF SCIENCE 3-6 (1967) [hereinafter GAMBLING].
101.
Levi recognizes that what are accepted beliefs at one point may be rejected
later if a "deeper curiosity" displaces old theories. GAMBLING, supra note 100, at 4-5.
For the recognized discussion of these scientific revolutions, see THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
97.
98.
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as we shall see below, skepticism as to all issues probably makes any
conclusion untenable. 102
Cohen and Holland et al., vigorously assert the context dependence
of inductive logic. Cohen points to the fact that claims of general theories
are not empirically testable." Holland et al. criticize the generalists'
approach for ignoring "environmental and cognitive realities." 0 ' Both
assert the role of the problem context as dispositive of the questions to be
asked to test an inductive theory.
For the purposes of our lawyer's problem, context sensitivity means
that she should ask questions that her training and experience have taught
her are relevant to the solution of her problem. She should ask about the
state of the case law, the nature of the facts, the disposition of the forum,
the availability of needed resources, etc. In terms of her problem
solution, it will generally not be helpful for her to speculate on the
wisdom of the advocacy model of fact finding or cosmic meaning of truth
in relation to her prospective client's perceptions. This precept of context
sensitivity is in tension with the next portion of the model, posing a broad
range of relevant question.
E. Relevant Variables
Cohen's "Theory of Relevant Variables," as he inevitably
denominates it, is best explained in his most recent book The Philosophy
of Induction and Probability. 5 The critical point which he makes is
that the appropriate degree of belief to accord a proposition rests not only
with the frequency with which it seems to be confirmed, but also with the
variety of circumstances over which it applies. This concept of spread he
attributes in inductive thought originally to John Maynard Keynes who
postulated it as the weight of a proposition but did not develop the
implications."0 ' As a statistical notion, of course, the idea that the
validity of a prediction rests not only on the position of the mean, but also
on the breadth of the standard deviation," 7 is not new. Holland
emphasizes it as well and further demonstrates that it is likely that people
use expectations about the spread of variables in making inductive
judgments."*
102.
103.
104.

See infra Section I11.1.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 25.
HOLLAND El" AL., supra note 66, at 5-9.

105.

See PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION, supra note 63, at 96-99.

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 102-03.
See PRACTICAL STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 51-91.
HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 185.
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Let me illustrate an aspect of the problem first with an example
drawn from Cohen."° Suppose that I know that on average nineteen
out of twenty sailing ships (in the days of the East India Clippers)
returned safely from their voyages. If I represent Lloyd's of London, I
might feel confident in charging a relatively small premium for an
insurance policy against total loss. But suppose not all kinds of ships
have the same success rate. If ships with rotten hulls average only fifty
percent returns, and if the owners of those ships take disproportionate
advantage of my low rates, I will go bankrupt fast. See Figure 10 for an
illustration of this bi-nodal problem. In legal terms, if the average verdict
in all auto injury cases is $500,000,110 as a plaintiff's attorney I could
be seriously misled unless I know that the average verdict where the
victim did not wear a seat belt was $50,000."'

Figure 10
There is an additional problem pointed out by Holland et al."'
There may be considerable overlap between categories. In Figure 11,
109.
110.
111.

PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION, supra note 63, at 96-97.
This is a purely mythical figure.
Another mythical amount. Insurers refer to problems of this type as risk

classification problems. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE,
LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 69-71 (1986).

112.

HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 185.
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assume curve 1 represents personal injury plaintiffs with no residual
impairment at the time of trial while curve 2 represents those with such
an impairment. If the curves are like those shown in Figure 11, this
difference is a very good predictor of verdicts because the average verdict
is much higher and there is very little overlap between the curves. 3
But if instead the proper curves should look like Figure 12, the value of
this distinction as a predictor all but disappears even though the averages
remain the same. This is because large numbers of both kinds of cases
fall in both the high and low recovery areas.
Cohen's real contribution on this point is in his insistence that the
reliability of an inductive judgment will rest fundamentally on whether the
decision maker has identified a sufficient breadth of variables." 4 Since
by definition we cannot know statistically the true spread of the variables
involved,' we need to protect against surprise by insuring to the extent
that we can that no specialized pocket of data is lying undiscovered and
that the apparent distinctions are really predictive.
The objective here is to prevent being blind-sided. If the lawyer in
the hypothetical neglected to consider the attitude of her judge toward the
granting of motions to dismiss, it would be clear to experienced lawyers
that she had made a fundamental mistake in assessing the variables
relevant to her case, but it is precisely this type of mistake that young
lawyers and non-lawyers make all the time." 6 They assume that there
is no variable there; that the only relevant issue is what the law says the
standard should be.
But, Holland et al. add an additional empirical finding to the mix.
They establish that people in general carry about with them a model of
the likely spread of variables within a particular sphere. In experiments
that they report, subjects were asked what conclusions about the reliability
of a small sample they would draw in different fields: chemistry,
ornithology, and human physiology. The judgments about reliability
113.
Again the data are mythical.
114.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 135-44.
115.
Unlike a "fair" game of chance, the true proportions of a population spread
on some variable cannot be known a priori or with true certainty unless the entire
population is polled. One cannot know the true proportion of registered Democrats
without consulting the voter rolls, and even then we know that that figure is only weak
inductive evidence for the likely results of the next election. Statistical techniques,
including the computations of standard deviations within a sample, are aimed at making
these inductive guesses better, and they work fairly well if the researcher has a true
sample of the "relevant" population and if there are no multi-nodal anomalies in the
population spread. But the kind of data on which they are based are not normally
available to the practical decision maker. PRACTICAL STATISTICS, supra note 27.
116.
HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 250-52, emphasizes the role of expertise
in bringing models closer to statistically normative predictors.
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differed sharply and consistently, depending on the field. Subjects
believed that a small sample of a chemical element could be safely
assumed to be very representative, while even a fairly large sample of
persons of a certain body type from an ethnic group was unlikely to be
representative of that group as a whole."' If this sort of conclusion is
as generalizable as the theorists believe, then we carry with us some inbuilt notions"' of how wide the spread of relevant variables in a field
is likely to be.
If our judgments about the likely number of relevant issues is not
only consistent but also accurate, there is no problem. In that
117.
Id. at 241-43. The experiment they report was conducted by Nisbett, Krantz,
Jepson, and Kunda and published in 1983:
Subjects were first given information about several novel kinds of objects and
then asked for their generalizations about the objects:
Imagine that you are an explorer who has landed on a little-known
island in the Southeastern Pacific. You encounter several new
animals, people, and objects. You observe the properties of your
"samples" and you need to make guesses about how common
these properties would be in other animals, people, or objects of
the same type.
Suppose you encounter a new bird, the shreeble. It is blue in
color. What percent of all shreebles on the island do you expect
to be blue?
Why did you guess this percent?
Subjects were also told that the shreeble was found to nest in a eucalyptus tree
and were asked what percent of all shreebles they expected to nest in
eucalyptus tree. The subjects then were told to imagine that they had
encountered a member of the "Barratos" tribe. He was brown in color, and
obese. Finally, they were told that they had encountered a sample of a rare
element called "floridium." It was stretched out to a filament and heated to
a very high temperature. The subjects were asked what percent of all
floridium they expected to conduct electricity and to burn with a green flame.
Id. On one sample above, subjects concluded that between 90 and 100% of all
"floridium" would be conductive and burn with a green flame. They rated "Barratos"
skin color as having the same degree of certainty. But they were willing to allocate only
a 70 to 80% certainty to shreeble color and nesting habits. Finally, they believe that there
was only a 30 to 40% chance that male "Barratos" would be obese. Thus it would appear
that people have clear and distinct models for variability depending on the kind of thing
being measured.
118.
The problem, of course, is that these in-built notions, which themselves must
come from inductive experience, may be wrong. The lawyer who is convinced that her
judge will not give more than a fixed proportion of marital goods to a divorcing wife may
be right in predicting the variability of the judge's behavior. But if, for example, she
does not realize that the presence of domestic violence would markedly increase the
judge's generosity, then her predictions about amounts formed in the "normal" case may
prevent her from seeking what is attainable for her client in the case where violence is
present.
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circumstance, not only will lawyers consistently look at the same number
of issues, but it will be the right number as well. If we cannot safely
conclude that this is the case, the tension between context sensitivity and
variable spread becomes a serious source of concern. That is because
context sensitivity tells the lawyer to concentrate on the issues that people
in her field see as relevant and the findings of Holland et al. indicate that
that list may be pretty well fixed; however, Cohen's emphasis on variable
breadth counsels against undue optimism that the right variables are in the
consensus mix.
To revert to the main example, suppose that the lawyer in the job
injury case did not see law reform as an option worth considering; it was
not on her list of relevant variables to inquire into the changes in the
attitude of her supreme court on issues of workers' remedies. If we
further assume that some law reform development was possible, then the
lawyer is doing herself and her perspective client a potential injustice by
failing to see the issue. In my view, truly successful decision making
contains a heavy dose of creative problem finding.119 The tension
between maintaining purposeful inquiry and avoiding tunnel vision is
endemic in the twin injunctions of context and breadth.
F. Hypothesis Testing
Once the lawyer has done the best she can at identifying the relevant
variables, how do we evaluate the impact of those variables on the issue?
Here Cohen and Holland et al. use very different language to describe
remarkably similar ideas.
Cohen, remember, has his background in the philosophy of science.
He sees the inductive process in the mode of the controlled experiment.
Therefore, he describes the approach as follows: Conduct a series of
progressively more complicated tests (these may be thought experiments)
combining at each stage a new variable so that after each new experiment
the decision maker will know whether that variable, in combination with
the others already tested, defeats or aids verification of the
hypothesis." Translated into the terms of the lawyer's problem, she
would first review the cases from her state court to determine the legal
standard applicable. Assuming that some set of facts would meet that
legal standard, she has passed the first variable. Next she should
probably take her prospective client's version of the facts in his case and
119.

See Patricia Kennedy Arlin, Wisdom: The Art of Problem Finding, in

WISDOM: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS, AND DEVELOPMENT 230 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1990)
For the role of issue expansion in the resolution of disputes, see, for example, DONALD
G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 55-60 (1989).

120.

COHEN, supra note 51, at 131-33.
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match them to the legal requisites. This is the second set of variables.
If there is no match (i.e., if the facts as the prospective client describes
them do not fit the available legal theory), the lawyer's hypothesis that
this is a tenable case has suffered a set back. If she does not believe she
can alter the law or discover additional facts that her prospective client
may not possess (i.e., if she cannot in some way modify the variable), she
must accept the falsification of her hypothesis and conclude that the case
cannot be won. If, on the other hand, the facts do fit the legal standard,
she has passed the second test and should proceed to the next, which
might be one of her available resources.
Holland et al. are concerned with the reality of how people think
and, to some extent, with replicating at least a facsimile of those thought
processes on the computer. They do not see the decision maker's activity
as a series of controlled experiments, but rather as the application of a
mental model formed from a series of default rules that will be applied
until they are found to be untenable.121 Thus, they would describe the
lawyer's thought process as a set of the following condition/action rules:
Rule 1: If a person has been injured and if that person has a
cause of action, then that person is entitled to damages.
[hunt for matching rule]
Rule 2: A person has a cause of action if he was injured
through the knowing and intentional act of his employer.
[match found "cause of action"]
[hunt for new match]

Rule N: If my prospective client says and if my prospective
client is credible in saying that he was injured through the
knowing and intentional act of his employer, then, all other
things being equal, he was injured through the knowing and
intentional act of his employer.
[match found "knowing and intentional act"]
[reality check, client does not say that]
121.

See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 29-101.
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[hunt for new match]
Rule N + 1: If my prospective client says and if my prospective
client is credible in saying that he does not know whether he
was injured through the knowing and intentional act of his
employer, but if I can prove through discovery that he was
injured through the knowing and intentional act of his employer,
then, all other things being equal, he was injured through the
knowing and intentional act of his employer.'"

Under both the Cohen model and that of Holland et al., the lawyer
would submit her hypothesis that the case was tenable to a series of tests
or condition/action rules.
Normally, if a particular test or rule
endangered her hypothesis, she would attempt to alter that test or rule to
find a way to preserve the hypothesis."n So, for example, when the
prospective client's testimony did not provide all of what was needed to
meet the legal standard, she altered the test or rule to accommodate
additional sources of proof. This alteration of the specific test or
generation of a new rule gives the decision maker a great deal of
flexibility and resilience But both Cohen and Holland et al. allow that
this resilience comes at a price.
In Cohen's system, the resilience is termed tolerance for
anomalies,"
and for Holland et al. it is called preservation of
z
defaults." Both point out correctly that a decision maker who had to
jettison her basic hypothesis or her underlying rules because of some
peripheral conflict, would have a very brittle inductive system. Cohen
122.
There are obviously some major assumptions built into this truncated model,
not the least of which is "all other things being equal." In real life, decision makers can
make some relatively safe background assumptions about normal conditions: gravity,
oxygen, the anglo-american jury system, etc. One of the values of thinking rules out in
this stilted sort of pseudo-code (computer talk for this kind of writing) is that it pushes one
to spell out those assumptions to avoid the kind of sloppy thinking evidenced here. In this
case, "all other things being equal" means the prospective client had the opportunity and
capacity to observe and report accurately what he saw. This is a rather large mouthful
to take for granted.
123.
Both Cohen and Holland et al. agree that the results of some tests are so
disconfirming that an entire reappraisal of the problem, not just tinkering at the edges, is.
required to create an accurate model. See COHEN, supra note 51, at 179-80; HOLLAND
Er AL., supra note 66, at 330-33. Although in their view the old model is less likely to
be replaced than displaced by a narrower, but still existent, sphere of influence.
124.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 162-66.
125.
HOLLAND r AL., supra note 66, at 183-85.
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uses the example of Newtonian mechanics and the motion of the Moon.
For a long time Newton's laws were thought to produce results at odds
with the observations of the movements of that body. Yet no one rejected
Newton's system with its extraordinary explanatory power because of this
anomaly nor would it have made sense to do so. Ultimately, according
to Cohen, the calculations were revised so that the system and the
observation were harmonized. 126 Likewise, it would make no sense for
the lawyer to discard her understanding of the general relevance of a
client's evidence just because in this circumstance that evidence is not
helpful.
However, there are circumstances in which the edifice of theories
does need to be shaken. Again according to Cohen, there was another
anomaly unexplained by Newton's laws: the movement of the perihelion
of Mercury." 7 That anomaly was also disregarded by physics for 250
years until it was explained by Einstein's general theory of relativity."n
Now, in the case of this paradigm shift, I am not greatly disturbed
because seventeenth century physics did not have the equipment or other
theories that would have been necessary to appreciate Einstein in any
case. I don't feel a great sense of loss in the delay. But the tolerance for
anomalies can translate, as Holland et al. show, into a protection of
unjustified beliefs which are inimical to the decision maker and perhaps
to others. " If for example the lawyer's rule structure called for
implicit belief in everything her prospective clients told her, she would
have a great deal of trouble making case acceptance decisions. If that
default rule remains entrenched in her structure, significant numbers of
anomalous experiences may not help to uproot it because those counter
examples will just generate the formation of lower level special case
defaults (e.g., I will believe all clients except those charged with
misdemeanors or I will believe all clients except those with red hair).
Amendment at the edges leaves a potentially fundamental flaw
unaddressed.

126.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 163. "It was not till 1752 that Clairaut showed
how the theory could be made to produce results that agreed with the observed
movements." Id.
127.
The point of the orbit nearest to the Sun's center. See OXFORD, supra note
64, at 885.
128.
COHEN, supra note 51, at 163.
129.
The protection of old rules which are left in place because special exceptions
are created to explain counter instances may explain why people cling to ethnic and racial
stereotypes, despite an apparent real friendship for a specific member of the stereotyped
group. See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 221-22, 245-49.
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G. Co-Variation
I have stylized the model by postponing to this point discussion of
the role of co-variation. By co-variation I mean the realization by the
decision maker that phenomena coincide.'
Without the recognition of
co-variation effects, it would be impossible to make any predictions. If
clouds do not, at least sometimes, presage rain, then noting an overcast
sky outside my window gives me no help in deciding what the weather

may be like in an hour. Similarly, if the fact that a client remembered
certain facts at an in-office interview did not provide at least some
assurance that that client would remember the same facts later on,

planning a trial strategy would be impossible.
Where the stylization comes in is in the fact that co-variation not
only helps evaluate the likely effects of test or rule application, it is also
critical in formulating tests and rules to begin with. The whole notion of
"relevant" variables calls for the decision maker noting some correlation

between the variable and the truth or falsity of the hypothesis. If there
is no co-variation, there is no relevance. Holland et al. would insist that

observation of co-variation precedes rule formation and that its role in the
testing model laid out above is to assist the decision maker in forming
new rules.131
The problem with this part of the prescription lies not with the

injunction, but with the execution. There is much research to indicate
that human beings are fairly poor judges of co-variation; they tend to be

misled by their expectations. 32 In addition, in the terminology of
information theory, there is too much noise in our environment.' 33 In

130.
See infra Part IV (discussing an important subspecies of co-variation:
causation). But for the moment, reference is to the more general co-occurrence without
any necessary causal link.
131.
See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 79-81.
132.
HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 27, at 10 ("There is mounting evidence that
people are extremely poor at performing such co-variation assessment tasks."); see also
id. at 93-97, 97-101; Dennis L. Jennings et al., Informal CovariationAssessment: DataBased versus Theory-BasedJudgments, in HEURISTICS, supra note 27, 211-30; HOOARTH,
supranote 13, at 114-30; YATES, supra note 8, at 163-83. These commentators are most
concerned that people pay more attention to what their theories lead them to think they
see than to what actually occurs.
133.
See JEREMY CAMPBELL, GRAMMATICAL MAN: INFORMATION, ENTROPY,
LANOUAOE AND LIFE 18 (1982). Noise is the non-information imparting aspect of the
environment. For example, static on a radio or a politician's deliberate attempt to
obfuscate. In this case it refers to the fact that people seldom get information from the
social environment that is not clouded by totally irrelevant data. One particular argument
may have swayed the judge, but to insure against reversal he may list several other, to
him unimportant, pieces of supporting evidence or logic.

1896

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

the language of psychology, we lack reliable feedback. 134 Judgments
about human interactions, of the kind that lawyers are asked to make,
typically involve long periods between the initiating action and the
supposed corollary. The art of drafting a complaint will not be seriously
tested '" in all likelihood until at least a year later when the case comes
to trial and the judge finds it useful or unuseful in understanding the
issues presented. In the meantime, many other things will happen in the
framing of the issues so that it will seldom be possible to get a clear
correlation between good complaints and well-focused cases. The
lawyer's rules about what constitutes a well-drafted document could
seldom be justified in terms of any strong claim to correlation testing.,'
H. Acceptance Threshold
Finally, I come to the issue of threshold, which is after all where I
started. Cohen is unwilling to let the Bayesians assume that either one
believes leprechauns or one believes no leprechauns. He wants to set a
threshold of agnosticism below which one is free to believe neither or
134.
See Janet L. Kolodner & Robert L. Simpson, Jr., Problem Solving and
Dynamic Memory, in ExPEREcE, MEMORY, AND RASONINo 99, 101 (Janet L.
Kolodner & Christopher K. Riesbeck eds., 1986); Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from
Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making, in HEURISTICS, supra note 27, at
268-83.
135.
This is assuming the complaint is sufficient to withstand the proforma motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
136.
For a good test of correlation, data are needed not only on the number of
instances in which the tested variable did or did not predict the outcome, but also on the
number of instances occurring without the presence of the tested variable. Thus on the
good complaint/good trial test, data are needed on the number of good trials and bad trials
given good complaints, but also on the number of good and bad trials given bad
complaints. These data are typically displayed in a 2x2 matrix or four cell diagram.

Good Complaint

Bad Complaint

Total

Good Trial

10

8

18

Bad Trial

5

4

9

Total

15

12

27

People also tend to concentrate entirely on the good complaint column of this matrix and
conclude from data like that shown here (purely fictitious) that good complaints yield good
trials. If the true data were like those shown, however, this conclusion would be
untenable because exactly the same proportion of good trials obtained in the bad complaint
column as well.
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credit each a little bit.137 Therefore, his system is non-additive and noncomplimentary. On this he and Holland et al. agree. 3 The lawyer
should only attach belief in the winning nature of the prospective client's
case to the extent that her assessment, after all relevant tests have been
performed, rises above some threshold. She is not required to believe in
that proposition affirmatively just because she does not reject it out of
hand. I have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of this position at
length above. The arguments will not improve through restatement here.
I. Summary
I have developed a prescription for extrapolation which has the
following characteristics. It requires context sensitivity to focus on the
problem at hand but attempts to balance too comfortable acceptance of
conventional wisdom by requiring that hypothesis be tested against all
relevant variables. It requires progressive testing, with the benefit that it
is resilient to unimportant anomalies but as a result may disregard
important falsifications as well. It calls for observation of co-variation as
its primary method for both rule creation and rule testing, thus being
appropriately empiric and responsive to the environment, but there is
evidence that faith in human perception of co-variation may be misplaced.
Finally, it permits us to be agnostic about unproven propositions and their
converses, but it does so at the price of opening the universe to unknown
forces and destroying our assurance in a tidy description.
In the face of these inherent weaknesses, it is no wonder that David
Hume, in 1739, enunciated the view that induction could never provide
a satisfactory basis for belief because humans can never be sure that the
world they see today will obtain tomorrow.'"
Other philosophers
would extend this skepticism to encompass the belief that people cannot
even know the present with any accuracy."
You will recall Dick Darman and the duck. Unfortunately for the
inductive mode of reasoning, and despite Mr. Darman's assurances, it is
possible to appear from a suitable distance to walk like a duck, look like
a duck, quack like a duck and still be,, if Hans Christian Anderson is to
137.
See supra Section III.B.
138.
See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 61-64.
139.
HACKING, supra note 25, at 176-85.
140.
See supra Section lLI.G for a discussion of the limits of human perception.
See also PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION, supra note 63, at 176-87. An example of this limit
on human observation is to be found in the Heisenberg principle, named after German
physicist Werner Heisenberg. That principle states that the momentum and the position
of a sub-atomic particle cannot be determined at the same time because the measurement
necessary to determine one will disturb the calculation of the other.
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be believed, a swan. The problem is that you are never sure that you
have identified all the right characteristics in such a way as to permit
certainty that your theoretical definitions of birds (or taxes) in fact mirror
reality. If you've got the right characteristics, you may nevertheless
harbor wrong beliefs about the way nature really is, and your
observations cannot be counted on to correct those beliefs because of the
structure of the beliefs themselves and the weakness of human perception.
Inductive reasoning must always be reasoning under some degree of
uncertainty You can suppress that uncertainty by treating it as if it is not
there, but you cannot remove it from reality so easily.
Despite these drawbacks, people cannot give up inductive reasoning.
If I could not conclude that because my alarm clock has always gone off
in the past, it is likely to go off tomorrow morning, I would have to stay
up all night to avoid over sleeping. Yet that conclusion depends on
various inductive beliefs about the function of electricity, the physics of
sound waves, the physiology of the human ear, etc. If the lawyer in the
problem could not conclude that the court system would deal in a
predictable way with this case, she could never project its potential for
success.
So the lawyer is caught in the bind: She knows that inductive
reasoning is inherently faulty, but she cannot get along without it.
IV. CAUSAL REASONING
A. Introduction
Both decision theory and inductive reasoning aid in determining what
will happen next. In this part, I will examine causal reasoning, which
seeks to determine why future events will occur. Why ask why? Three
professions or disciplines use causal reasoning to meet three rather
different objectives. Scientists seek to determine why events occur as
they do so that science may deepen and simplify its understanding of the
basic principles that govern our world. Their motives are both elegance
and utility: elegance of a concept pleasing to the intellect, and utility of
understanding the rules by which the world functions so we can bend
those rules to our own purposes.
From a slightly different perspective, the doctor and the fault
engineer seek to know why a system malfunctions so that they can fix it.
This diagnostic use of causal reasoning is one of the most widely studied.
. Finally, lawyers seek to know why for yet another
purpose. Our
profession uses the why question as a means of knowing what occurred.
Let me explain how it works. If I know the motives of potential actors,
I have a pretty good means of predicting what their actions have been or
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will be. It is for this reason that one of the oldest guideposts in the
detection of crime is "who benefits."
So scientists seek broader knowledge of underlying rules, doctors
diagnose malfunctions, and lawyers use causal reasoning as a means of
explaining what has happened or will happen. In this part, I will take a
detour first to discuss briefly these three uses of causal reasoning. Then
I will revert to my customary pattern of first laying out the methodology
and then analyzing that methodology with an eye to explication and
evaluation.
B. Uses of Causal Reasoning
Wesley C. Salmon, in his book on causal reasoning in science, points
out that people want to know why events occur." 1 Salmon uses the
example of the tides.142 Man has known since earliest marine history
that the ebb and flow of the tides correlates with the position and phases
of the moon. The co-variation or frequency of correlation was well
known. But it was not until Newton's causal theory of gravity was
advanced that these correlations were explained. Once mankind had a
gravitational theory, however, it could reason well beyond the
phenomenon of the tides. Rather than predicting solely in areas where
data had already been collected (tide tables and almanacs), scientists could
use the gravitational theory to predict the precise year in which Halley's
comet would return" or to forecast the speed necessary for a rocket to
attain earth orbit for the first time. 44
The American philosopher of science Charles S. Peirce, in the early
1900s, developed a paradigm of scientific discovery."
In Peirce's
model, the scientist first develops a causal theory about how some system
under consideration functions. For example, the solar system works as
it does because of the effects of gravity. This process he called
abduction, and the word has recently gained currency denoting the
thought process in which potential explanations are developed." He
141.

WESLEY

C.

SALMON,

ScIENTIFic

EXPLANATION

AND

THE

CAUSAL

STRucruRE OF THE WORLD 3, 6 (1984).

142.
Id. at 14.
143.
Id. at 11-12.
144.
As I shall discuss infra Section IV.I, possession of a causal theory also helps
avoid mistakes that use of the pure probabilistic model would occasion.
145.
See NICHOLAS RESCHER, PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2-3, 41-51
(1978).
146.

See ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 2; EuGENE CHARNLAx & DREW
McDERMOTr, INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 21-22, 453-54 (1985)
[hereinafter CHARNIAK]; HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 66, at 89; Paul Thagard,
Explanatory Coherence, in 12 BEHAVIOR & BRAIN SCIENCES 435, 435 (1989).
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believed that once an hypothesis was formed, scientists used deductive
methods to determine what events should follow from the theory (e.g., if
gravity is at work, then planetary orbits should be more or less circular)
and then used inductive methods to test whether those events did in fact
follow (e.g., observation indicates that these orbits behave as
predicted). 47 The entire sequence he called retroduction. If Peirce is
right-as he seems to be in that the hypothetico-deductive method is a
recognized scientific approach'"-then the scientific method is at least
initially based on causal reasoning. It is certainly the case, as Salmon
points out,149 that a causal explanation is the objective of scientific
search.
In medical and other fault diagnosis situations,' 5° practitioners are
required to reason causally. If one examines the doctor's thought
process, it goes something like this: 51 "The patient has symptoms
including fever, spots, and dehydration; disease X causes fever, spots,
and dehydration; no other common disease causes this particular
combination of symptoms; therefore, it is likely that the patient has
disease X.' 52 Virtually all medical diagnosis is made this way,'
and it must have some utility or we would not enjoy the relative good
health which characterizes this age.
Finally, closer to home, there is compelling evidence that jurors
decide law suits by means of causal reasoning. Nancy Pennington and
Reid Hastie conducted a series of experiments designed to determine how
jurors decide their verdicts."
In the first experiment Pennington
147.

See CHARLES S. PEIRCE, CHANCE, LOVE, AND LOGIC 132-35 (1923);

CHARLES S. PEIRCE, SELECTED WRITINOs: VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE 368-72
(Phillip P. Wiener ed., 1958).
148.
149.

See RESCHER, supra note 145, at 3.
SALMON, supra note 141, at 9.

150.
See ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 1-9.
151.
I hasten to point out that my degree lies in law, not in medicine. Anyone
looking for reliable descriptions of medical symptomatology should look elsewhere.
152.
For further discussion of this reasoning method, see ABDUCTIVE, supra note
59, at 1-11; CHARNIAK & McDERMOrr, supra note 146, at 453-65.
153.
Medical tests, except those that pinpoint specific disease organisms, are
generally simply more refined ways of identifying symptoms. X-ray, ultrasound, cat scan
and other tests can actually picture diseased members, but even then the doctor is
conjecturing about causal mechanism at work.
154. ' See PENNINOTON, supra note 54, at 156; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
A Theory of Explanation-Based Decision Making, Paper Delivered at a Conference on
Decision and Inference in Litigation at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Mar. 25,
1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie: Decision]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
242-58 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie: Evidence Evaluation]; Nancy Pennington
& Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on
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presented people drawn from the actual Boston jury pool with a
videotaped murder trial and the instructions which a judge would provide
at the close of the case. She then asked the jurors to talk aloud as they
reasoned their way to a decision. These verbal descriptions of the jurors'
thought processes were recorded and transcribed. They were then
systematically coded to classify the types of statements made. What
emerged were stories depending heavily on judgments about causal
motivation. Further, jurors told one of several basic stories, and the story
that they told correlated perfectly with the verdict that they reached.155
Thus, those whose verdict was that the defendant was guilty of murder in
the first degree told a story of the events leading to the killing which was
different from that told by those who would have acquitted the defendant.
They marshalled different facts and, most importantly for my purposes
now, they saw different motives as underlying the fatal fight. Those
favoring murder one saw causes consistent with premeditation; those
favoring acquittal saw self-defense as the cause for the defendant's
actions. I will discuss below the influence of the juror's causal beliefs on
the way the evidence was not only classified but even remembered.IThe issue that is important here is that the process in which the legal
system asks its decision makers to engage is very like that involved in
diagnostic decision making discussed above. The legal system frequently
makes state of mind a key issue in the case: negligence, wilfulness,
premeditation, carelessness. It almost never provides direct evidence of
that state of mind. An admission such as, "It's all my fault; I didn't
look where I was going," is very rare evidence indeed. Instead, the
system presents the decision maker with symptomatic evidence of the state
of mind of the participants in a particular set of events: observations of
other people, gaps in the parties' current testimony, etc. The system asks
adjudicators-judges or juries-to reconstruct from this symptomatic
evidence the underlying mental state that caused the parties to act as they
did. The system requires reasoning from symptoms (current evidence) to
causes (underlying mental states). Lawyers argue causally to the fact
finder. "This evidence only makes sense if you accept that the defendant
was not paying sufficient attention to what he was doing."
So there are three important fora in which at least part of the basic
mode of reasoning is, in Pierce's phrase, "abductive."
Scientists,
doctors, judges and jurors reason to some extent in the following mode:
"I see the following result before me: patient symptom, event in nature,
Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
(1988).
155.
156.

PPNNINOTON, supra

LEARNINO, MEMORY AND COGNITION 521-33

note 54, at 148, 156.

See infra Section IV.I.
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or legal evidence. As far as I know, only X cause is likely to have
produced that result. Therefore, I will hypothesize that X cause did

produce that result."
I submit that at least in some instances, practicing lawyers reason in
precisely this manner as well. "That will be a good argument to make to
Judge X because Judge X tends to favor consumers over merchants in
cases like this, and therefore, he will buy this consumer-oriented claim."
I think this kind of explanatory thinking frequently characterizes a
lawyer's analysis of the likely thought processes of a decision maker.
Since those thought processes, unlike their overt results, are not directly
accessible, lawyers must reason on these issues from the outward
evidence backward to the likely cause. Given an almost certain dearth of
direct evidence on how a particular decision maker will decide precisely
this issue, causal reasoning is called upon to bridge the gap. Like the fact
finder reconstructing the defendant's state of mind from the evidence at
trial, the lawyer attempts to construct the likely state of mind of the
adjudicator responding to the evidence she has marshalled and the
argument she has made.
C. Methodology
Let me provide an example in which the lawyer whose decision
making methods I have followed throughout this Article might use causal
reasoning to decide a problem. I will suppose that the lawyer is
representing a criminal defendant on a charge of simple burglary. In her
state, as in most, one of the elements of burglary, which distinguishes it
from trespass, is that the alleged perpetrator intended to commit a felony
while on the premises. She has marshalled very substantial evidence that
her client was severely intoxicated when the police found him on the
premises. Since burglary is a "specific intent crime," requiring proof of
the intent to commit a felony, the right degree of intoxication is a defense
(arguably precluding the formation of the requisite intent). If the alleged
perpetrator was so drunk that he did not know where he was or if he was
so drunk that he was simply looking for a place to sleep, he is not guilty
of burglary.
The decision that the lawyer must make is whether she should
recommend that her client insist on his right to jury trial or waive a jury
trial to be tried by the judge alone.' 57 I will assume as is the case in
most jurisdictions that the lawyer knows to which judge the case has been
157.
1 will assume that a plea bargain is not available or is undesirable for some
reason. Also, please note here that the ultimate decision must rest with the client because
of the rights implicated.
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assigned before this decision must be made irrevocably. I will also
assume that she has sufficient experience to know the general
characteristics of venires in her area so she has a good idea of the mix of
jurors she is likely to draw. The question is, in this particular case,
which fact finder is more likely to favor her client. There is some
evidence that lawyers may be pretty good at making these decisions.
Kalven and Zeisel, in the American Jury,15 report that in criminal cases
in which the lawyer elected to retain the jury, the judge's hypothetical
verdict tended in a significant measure to be harsher than that rendered
by the jury.
Let me theorize about how such a decision might be made using
causal reasoning. By contrasting the set of facts that might cause the
judge to accept her intoxication defense with the set that might cause the
jury to do so, the lawyer attempts to select the most plausible scenario for
acquittal using this defense.
The approach that she should use can be summarized as follows.
First, as with induction, she needs to identify phenomena that co-vary
with case outcomes. In her past experience, what features of cases, such
as strength of legal arguments, client credibility, weakness of eyewitness
evidence, etc., characterized those that led to acquittal? She is looking
for specific forms of co-variation that identify possible causal factors.
Having identified possible causes, she will have to rely on three tests
to determine whether the candidates are merely co-occurring events or
whether they remain in the running as possible causal explanations. One
of these tests depends on contextual knowledge akin to that which figured
also in induction. Do the proposed causes mesh with her understanding
of how the courts work? The second test is easier to apply though
surprisingly important. She needs to be sure that the proposed cause
precedes the result in time. Finally, she must determine whether some
158.
HARRY KALVEN," JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)
[hereinafter JURY]. In this widely recognized empirical study of jury behavior, Kalven
and Zeisel sought to measure the differences between the jury and the presiding judge as
"judges of the case." To do this they asked presiding judges in jury trials to record,
before the. jury returned, the verdict that they would have reached had they heard the
matter without a jury.
159.
With regard to their study, Kalven and Zeisel noted "[tihe jury is less lenient
than the judge in 3 percent of the cases and more lenient than the judge in 19 percent of
the cases." Id. at 58-59. Of course these data give us only half the story. They did not
study whether advocates displayed similar predictive powers when those advocates elected
to waive jury. Such a study would be very difficult to conduct because it would involve
the empaneling of shadowjuries in situations where the defense had waived. But without
these data, it is impossible to know where predictions are really good or whether juries
always favor defendants more heavily than do judges. This is an example of the four cell
co-variation problem. See supra note 136.
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link exists between the putative cause and the result she seeks to predict.
For example, if the fact finder could not have learned of the evidence
which is assumed to be the influential cause, then that theory of causation
must be dismissed.
If the lawyer is convinced that she has identified a potential causal
relationship, she must determine whether that relationship is the true
cause or best explanation of the result. She will see whether the
relationship explains or "covers" all the facts at her disposal. If some key
phenomenon, for example a relationship between client demeanor and
verdict, is not explained by the theory, then that theory is suspect.
Finally, she will see whether this explanation is the most economical or
simplest available. As with previous methodologies, let me examine these
steps one at a time.
D. Mill's Co-Variation Tests
John Stuart Mill provided a model of causal reasoning in 1852.11
The version of his model that I will discuss is that set forth in Brian
Skyrms's excellent introduction to decision modeling, Choice and
Chance.161 The approach here is one of systematic co-variance
observation." 6 Only by noting co-variation can the lawyer lay the
foundation for identifying cause. Mill's tests are designed to identify two
separate kinds of causality. A "necessary cause" 1" is one which cannot
be absent when the result caused is present. For example, oxygen is a
"necessary cause" of combustion. By contrast, a "sufficient cause" is one
which cannot bepresent when the result caused is missing. Oxygen is not
a "sufficient cause" of fire, thank goodness, because oxygen is present in
many cases in which fire is absent. In the combustion example, one
160.
See JOHN S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LoGiC (8th ed., Harper & Bros. 1874).
161.
BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE & CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE
Looic 75-111 (3d ed. 1986). Skyrms credits much of his analysis to GEORo H. VON
WRIGHT, A TREATISE ON INDUCTION AND PROBABILITY (1960).

For another discussion

of Mill's approach, see COHEN, supra note 51, at 144-51.
162.
See supra Section III.G. As pointed out there, human beings are not
generally very good at co-variance detection.
163.
I will use the term "cause" throughout this discussion of Mill's methods.
This is a little unfair to both Mill and Skyrms. Mill did not claim that his method isolated
"causes." Rather he said that it identified, "effect[s], or cause[s], or necessary part[s] of
causes." See MILL, supra note 160, at 225. See also id. at 222, 224, 229, 233. Skyrms
substitutes the term "condition" for "cause" throughout his text and thus finesses the issue
of causality, although he points out that Mill thought he was testing for causes. SKYRMS,
supra note 161, at 88. Therefore, when I discuss the fact that co-variance cannot insure
causality, infra Section IV.E, I am to some extent battering a straw man of my own
creation.
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"sufficient cause" for fire would be the presence of the right combination
of fuel, oxygen, and a match. Therefore, the result of a causal process
may be present when a "necessary cause" is there, but if a "sufficient
cause" is present the result must occur.
Once this difference between the two types of causes is recognized,
it is possible to reason backward using a presence/absence"' table to see
which possible causes that co-occur with a result may actually be a
"necessary" or "sufficient cause." I will stick with the fire example first.
If you will look at Table I, you will see such a table composed after the

occurrence of three fires. Each fire is shown in rows marked occurrence
#143. Each possible causal agent is listed across the top and is assigned
a column. The result, a fire, is listed in the last column.
Table I
on

Wood

#1

P

A

02

P

#3

A

Match

Water

Sparky

P

P

P

P

P

A

P

P

A

P

P

P

P

P

A

P

p

Oxygen

F11e

At the first fire, gas was present (P), wood absent (A), oxygen
present (P), match present (P), water present (P), and Sparky, the fire
house Dalmatian, present (P). The fact that fire resulted is shown in the
last entry, fire present (P). Based on these data all of the possible causal
agents with the exception of wood is a candidate for a "necessary cause."
They were present when the fire eventuated. However, in occurrence #2,
water is missing (A) while the fire is still present (P). From this
information, it is safe to conclude that water is not "necessary" to a fire.
Fires can occur without water being present. The system seems to be
working well, but now examine occurrence #3. Here suddenly gas which
164.
This type of table and particularly the values assigned to disjunctive (or) and
conjunctive (and) combinations are modeled on the "truth tables" integral to Boolean
logic. For a discussion of this relationship, see SKYRMS, supra note 161, at 75-82.
Boolean logic is named for George Boole, an English mathematician who lived from 1815
to 1864. Most lawyers are familiar with his symbolic algebra of connections, "not,"
"and," and "or," but not necessarily with its source. It is this logic that underlies
searches in full-text databases such as "Lexis" and "Westlaw."
For an additional
discussion of this form of logic, see RuDY RECKER, MINDTooLs: THE FIVE LEVELS OF
MATHEMATICAL REALITY 207-12 (1987).
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had been present at both previous fires is now absent (A). Equally
surprising is wood, which had been absent at the previous fires and is
now present (P). This serves to illustrate that "necessary causes" may be
disjunctively compound. That is, the table needs a new column, see
Table II, which is titled (Gas or Wood). With this column, the
observations previously made are reconciled with this new information.
So, after these three observations, you can see that the possible necessary
causes have been whittled down to (Gas or Wood), 1 Oxygen, Match,
and Sparky, the firehouse Dalmatian. Your instincts may tell you that
Sparky ought to be eliminated as a possible cause or perhaps should never
have made the table in the first place, but I want to reserve until later a
discussion of why this may be so. For the moment, Sparky stays put.
Table II

Gas or
Wood

Oxygen

Match

Water

Spliky

Fire

01

P

P

P

P

P

P

12

P

P

P

A

P

P

13

P

P

P

A

P.

P

Now that there is a list of possible "necessary causes," I need a
method to test for any "sufficient causes." You will remember that if a
"sufficient" cause is present, the result must occur. Therefore, the
obvious test is to look for instances in which some or all of the possible
"necessary causes" are present, but fire does not occur. Look to Table
III. I have listed one column for (Gas or Wood), one for Oxygen, one
for the Match, and one for Sparky. In the first occurrence, when there
is a fire, all four possible "necessary" and "sufficient causes" are present.
In the next instance (row #2), in which there is no fire (A) all of the
possible causes are present except Oxygen. This reveals that (Gas or
Wood), the Match and Sparky cannot be "sufficient causes" separately or
in combination. They occurred, and fire did not. Finally in occurrence
#3, I test whether Oxygen is a "sufficient cause." Removing all the other
possible causes, you see that Oxygen by itself does not cause the fire (A).
165.
Knowing what I do about fires, I might be tempted to short circuit the process
and just call it generically carbon based fuel, but remember, at this state I know nothing
about fire beyond the three examples shown.
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Table III

Gas or
Wood

Oxygen

Match

Sparky

Fire

#1

P

P

P

P

P

f2

P

A

P

P

A

03

A

P

A

A

A

The question is what conclusion should I draw now. Two are
available. The first is that none of the possible causes is a "sufficient
cause." This would be a tenable proposition. There are many occasions
in which some circumstances are the "but for" or "necessary causes" of
an event, but require other events to intervene before the result occurs.
A banana peel in front of the produce section is the "necessary cause" of
my fall on a banana peel. (I would not have fallen if I had not stepped
on the peel.) But it only becomes part of the "sufficient cause" when
coupled with my inattention to where I am putting my feet. I could also
hypothesize, however, that some combination of the possible causes
already identified constitutes a "sufficient cause." See Table IV. If I add
a column to the table for the conjunction of ((Gas or Wood) and Oxygen
and Match and Sparky), you will see that it correlates perfectly with the
final column for fire. Thus, you and I could conclude that "All of the
Above" are the "sufficient cause" for fire.
Table IV

Gas or
Wood

Oxygen

Match

Sparky

All

Fre

01

P

*P

P

P

P

P

#2

P

A

P

P

A

A

3

A

P

A

A

A

A

Mill's tests go on to more complicated patterns of data and
combinations of possible causes, but this discussion has been sufficient
(and necessary?) for my purposes. Let me turn now to how the insights
here will assist the lawyer in deciding whether to waive jury in her
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client's burglary case. I will assume that in the past she has tried eight
cases before this judge involving an intoxication defense to a burglary
charge.'" In four she waived jury and in four she kept the jury. I will
further assume that those juries were very like the venire she faces now.
See Table V for a summary of her experience. The columns labeled
burglary and intoxication are self-explanatory and are true in each case.
The column labeled Jury indicates when she waived (A) and when she
retained (P). The column entitled Legal Claim indicates those instances
in which she was able to make a very solid legal argument that her client
fell within the defense (P) and when she could not make such an argument
vigorously (A). The Sympathetic Defendant column indicates those
instances in which her client was appealing (P) and those in which the
client was not (A). The result, acquittal column shows a (P) when the
client was acquitted and an (A) when he was not. Of course what my
example shows is the very unlikely occurrence of a perfect covariation. 167
Concentrate on the last three causes: Jury, Legal Claim, and
Sympathetic Defendant. In the two instances (cases #1 & #2) where jury.
was waived and a strong legal argument was made, an acquittal was
obtained. However, in case #6 where the jury was retained, and a strong
legal argument was made, but the client was unsympathetic, acquittal did
not occur. In terms of Mill's tests, a strong legal case by itself is not a
"sufficient cause" of acquittal. However, the conjunction of a strong case
and jury waiver may be a "sufficient cause" of such an acquittal. Also,
a strong legal case cannot be the "necessary cause" of acquittal because
an acquittal took place in case #7 when such a strong case was missing.
On the other hand, it would appear that the disjunction, either a strong
legal case or a sympathetic defendant, is "necessary" to acquittal because
in the two cases (case #4 and case #8) where both were missing an
acquittal was never obtained.
Thus, based on Mill's tests, the lawyer would form the following
tentative causal hypothesis: "If I am to win this case, I must have either
a strong legal theory or a sympathetic defendant. If my legal argument
166.
This is highly unlikely, even in one judge jurisdictions, given the frequency
of plea bargains and the relative infrequency of this defense. However, the assumption
will illustrate my point, so I will make it for didactic purposes.
167.
It is unlikely in two respects. First, the correlation is too good to reflect
reality. Second, I do not believe that the legal system functions as I have depicted it. I
think judges respond to sympathetic defendants with about the same frequency that juries
do, and I think that a compelling legal claim frequently has a compelling factual
foundation and is thus as persuasive to a jury as to a judge. But again for didactic
purposes this model is helpful, and one closer to reality would require too much
explanation of my underlying prejudices about jury waiver choice, which is not the topic
here.
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Burgmy

Intoxication

Jwy

Legal Claim

1909

Sympathetic D

Acquit

#I

P

P

A

P

P

P

12

P

P

A

P

A

P

13

P

P

A

A

P

A

14

P

P

A

A

A

A

#5

P

P

P

P

P

P

#6

P

P

P

P

A

A

#7

P

P

P

A

P

P

is

P

P

P

A

A

A

is strong, but my defendant unsympathetic, I should opt for the judge.
If my defendant is sympathetic, but my legal argument weak, I should
choose the jury. If both are strong, it does not matter which forum I
elect.'"
These conclusions are almost certainly too simplistic, but they do
serve to illustrate that co-variation data can serve both to eliminate a
causal hypothesis-here a sympathetic defendant does not always
win-and to home in on hypotheses which may be worth further testing.
It is important to keep in mind that, regardless of Mill's terminology, the
fact that data do co-vary is no true guarantee of causation. (I discuss this
issue below.)
I will stop here to introduce the important caveat that there is very
good reason to believe that decision makers do not in fact perform
detailed co-variation analysis of the kind called for in Mill's tests when
they develop causal theories. As I have discussed above, people in
general are bad at this kind of co-variation analysis"w and quite adept

168.
The lawyer here might add a further explanatory layer and assert that the
judge is more amenable to legal persuasion than the jury because of the judge's greater

familiarity with legal arguments or for some other reason.
EXPLANATION PATTERNS: UNDERSTANDING

See ROOER C. SCHANK,

MECHANICALLY AND CREATIVELY 44-16

(1986) (distinguishing between explanations that make sense of the world (explain
reasoning processes) from those that advance a theory about why the world works as it

does).
169.

See supra Section M1.G.
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at developing causal theories."
One explanation of these facts
currently enjoying considerable respect is that people do notice surprising
failures of co-variation expectations. They learn from those failures of
prediction but do not store the information developed as rules of the kind
produced here (fuel + oxygen + ignition = fire). Rather they store the
learning as stories (when I lit that fire) of which subsequent events remind
them and from which they draw lessons for future conduct.171 So the
lawyer in my example may be overly observant in the pattern recognition
capacities with which I have credited her.
E. Separating Co-Variancefrom Causality by Contextual Knowledge
Whether the lawyer does well or poorly at noticing co-variations, all
she has done to this point is to identify some possible causes of the result
she seeks. If causal theories do contribute to the understanding of
uncertain situations, then it is clear that mere co-variance will not insure
that causal links have been identified. Yun Peng and James A. Reggia in
Abductive Inference Modelsfor DiagnosticProblem-Solving"2 make this
point through use of an area diagram. See Figure 13. The upper left
hand quarter contains the instances in which both of the co-varying
phenomena are present. Within that group of phenomena which may be
seen to co-vary, only some (those illustrated by the circle) will do so
because one event causes the other. Part of co-variation will almost
certainly be purely coincidental and part may reflect a third, as yet
unknown, cause." 3 Other tests, beyond co-variation must be imposed
to determine whether the lawyer has identified possible causal agents.
First, it is the context of the discipline within which the causal
connection is sought that tells the decision maker whether her proposed
cause is tenable. Let me discuss how this meshes with the two types of
"cause" identified in Mill's test above. It is relatively easy to see that a
possible "necessary cause" might not be a cause at all. You will recall
170.
See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments
under Uncertainty[hereinafter Causal Schemas], in HEURISTICS, supranote 27, at 117-18.
See also HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 27, at 10, 113-38.
171.
See ROGER C. SCHANK, DYNAMIC MEMORY: A THEORY OF REMINDING AND
LEARNING IN COMPuTERs AND PEOPLE 7-29 (1982); ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A
STORY: A NEw LOOK AT REAL AND ARTIFICIAL MEMORY 56-83 (1990); Stephen J. Read,

Constructing Causal Scenarios:A Knowledge Structure Approach to CausalReasoning,
52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 288 (1987).
172.
See ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 101-04; SALMON, supranote 141, at 121.
See also ELLERY EELLS, PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY 56-57 (1991) [hereinafter EELLS:
PROBABILISTIC] ("It is famous that 'correlation is no proof of causation' and it is also true

that causation does imply correlation.").
173.
See infra Section IV.J.
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Figure 13
that the definition of a "necessary cause" is a condition which cannot be
absent when the result is present. My example was oxygen ("necessary
cause") which cannot be absent if combustion (result) is to take place.
You will also recall, however, that a "necessary cause" may be present
when the result does not occur. Oxygen is present in many situations in
which there is no fire. So stripped of the causative language and looked
at purely as a matter of co-variation, one phenomenon (oxygen) may be
present (vary) whether or not another phenomenon (combustion) occurs.
Any number of phenomena answer this description which I certainly
would be unlikely to label causal. The world's oceans for example are
present whether or not fire occurs.174 Fire never takes place, as far as
I know, without the existence of the those oceans. But I would not hold
that oceans cause fire. What makes me believe that oxygen is causative
of fire is only to a small extent its co-variation pattern. That pattern
makes oxygen a candidate for the status of "necessary causal" agent, but
does no more. It is the scientific context of physics and chemistry that
prompts me to label oxygen truly a "but for" cause of fire.

174.
Although not necessarily in their present form, however, if we are to believe
theories of continental drift and plate tectonics.
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The lawyer has concluded that a strong legal argument or a
sympathetic defendant are the necessary disjunctive "cause" of an
acquittal. Our understanding of the legal context does not rule out this
causal hypothesis. We expect both legal merit and community values to
influence legal decision making.
It is a little harder to see that the role of Mill's "sufficient cause" is
also only to propose candidates for consideration as causal theories. After
all, you will recall that to constitute a "sufficient cause" a phenomenon
cannot be present when the result is absent. This definition does not
insure that there is perfect co-variance between the proposed agent and
result. It is possible that the result could be present without the putative
cause. 75 However, it does insure that whenever the proposed cause is
present, the result occurs. Again the example from the combustion
discussion comes to mind. Doesn't the fact that fuel, oxygen, and a
match are always present at a fire guarantee that these are the causes of
that fire? Unfortunately no. What guarantees the fire is the physics and
chemistry of combustion, not the presence of co-variation.
My original combustion example contained a co-variation whose
causal import seems dubious. It was the presence of Sparky, the
firehouse Dalmatian. Sparky's presence correlated perfectly with the
result and obeyed all the other rules for a part of a "sufficient conjunctive
cause." But leaving aside the possibility that the fire chief may be both
an animal fancier and a pyromaniac, in which case we would have
unearthed an explanation for Sparky's presence, I would set aside this
correlation because I have no adequate causal theory to explain it. It does
not fit in the context of combustion.176
Are the lawyer's "sufficient causal" hypotheses contrary to common
understanding of the trial court context? I don't believe so. It is not
inherently unreasonable that a judge trained in law would be more
persuaded by legal arguments, while jurors brought in to reflect the
community should be more amenable to appeals to sympathy.

175.
All that is guaranteed by status as a "sufficient cause" is that the first cell in
the table (Present/Present) and the second cell (Present/Absent) will always correlate
perfectly. That is when the "cause" is present, the "effect" will be present, and when the
"cause" is present, the "effect" cannot be absent. It tells nothing about the third and
fourth cells. It tells nothing about what happens when the "cause" is absent. The
"effect" may occur anyway. For example, every time I have looked out the window
today, the sun has been shining. My gaze out the window meets the test as a "sufficient
cause" for the sunshine. But for all I know, the sun has elected to shine all day today,
with or without my assistance.
176.
It is, of course, possible that some such theory would emerge in the future.
See my discussion of context in the inductive part of this Article, supra Section III.D.
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F. CausalityImplies Precedence
Once causal candidates make sense in the context of the court
system, the lawyer must be certain that the phenomenon which she views
as causal precedes the phenomenon which she sees as a result.1" This
point seems self-evident but involves two issues which need attention: one
theoretical, one practical. Probability theory, which is concerned only
with correlations, not causes, has no such time direction requirement. So
the fact that two phenomena are correlated is a symmetrical relationship,
whereas the fact that one causes the other is not.178 This is not the only
reason why conventional probability theory cannot adequately describe
causality (see my discussion below), but it is an important disability.
There is evidence that decision makers assume temporal order far too
quickly. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman posed the following
problem to experimental subjects:
Let A be the event that before the end of next year, Peter will
have installed a burglar alarm system in his home. Let B
denote the event that Peter's home will be burglarized before
the end of next year. Let A and B denote the negations of A
and B, respectively.
Question: Which of the two conditional probabilities, P(A IB) or
P(A IB), is higher?
Question: Which of the two conditional probabilities, P(B IA) or
P(B I A), is higher?
The researchers report their result: "A large majority of the subjects (132
of 161) stated that P(A IB) > P(A IB) and that P(B IA) < P(B IA), contrary
to the laws of probability."'
The mistake the subjects made, of
course, is that they neglected to take the direction of time into account in
formulating their answers. A burglary only makes installing a burglar
alarm more likely if the burglary precedes the installation. But
conversely, the installation of a burglar alarm only makes a burglary less
likely if it precedes the burglary. It is the failure to have a consistent
177.
See EELLS: PROBABILISTIC, supra note 172, at 239-77.
178.
Id. at 239-44.
179.
See Causal Schemas, supra note 170, at 123. Problems of temporal ordering
of causal inferences are frequent enough to have earned a name and are called Turoff's
problems. If you need a reminder on the meaning of the notation I am using, see supra
note 14.
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hypothesis about which came first that led the respondents into error here.
Respondents neglected caution about temporal priority.
In the lawyer's example, temporal priority is not a problem. The
decision to waive or retain the jury coupled with either making the strong
legal arguments or demonstrating the clients' sympathetic characters all
preceded trial outcomes in her previous cases.
G. Cause and Effect Must Be Linked
Finally there must be an actual causal link of some type between the
putative cause and its effect. The precise nature of the causal link is itself
context sensitive to a degree. In the physical sciences, a cause probably
is best defined, as Salmon does, as that which brings about a change in
a physical process. Thus a fire might heat and thus cause a change in a
liquid, or one mass might influence (by striking, gravity, or some other
means) or cause a change in the path of a second mass." s In
understanding human reactions, notions of goals and motives figure
strongly in causal schemes, as Pennington and Reid point out. So an
actor is said to be influenced-i.e., to have his behavior caused-by a
combination of these internal goals and the events which befall him.1"'
Attempting to work out a general causal schema, Roger Schank and
Robert Abelson identified five rules which they believed described a
complete causal syntax:
CS1
CS2
CS3
CS4
CS5

Actions can result in state changes.
States can enable actions.
States can disable actions.
States (or acts) can initiate mental states.
Mental states can be reasons for actions."

Inherent in all those ideas is interplay or interaction between the
possible cause and the result. If the lawyer had provided the jury with no
way of learning of her client's sympathetic nature, then she would be illadvised to assume that that nature influenced the jury to acquit.
Assuming she has not made this error, she now has causal
hypotheses that accord with her prior experience, are congruent with her
understanding of the court room context, are in the right temporal order,
180.
See SALMON, supra note 141, at 139-47. Salmon also identifies another sort
of cause type which he calls propagation. For his discussion, see id. at 147-57.
181.
Pennington & Hastie: Decision, supra note 154, at 5; Pennington & Hastie:
Evidence Evaluation, supra note 154, at 243-44.
182.
ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, ScRiwrs, PLANS, GOALS AND
UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTo HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCrURES 25-27 (1977).
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and demonstrate some link between the cause and effect.
But,
unfortunately, an hypothesis could meet all those tests and yet not be the
true explanation of the result under study. Look now at Table VI. I have
added a new column entitled "Female." Let me assume that no acquitted
defendants were female (A) and all convicted defendants were (P). The
lawyer now has a rival, and at least as powerful, causal hypothesis."t
It appears that judges and juries in her locale may, in burglary
intoxication cases, discriminate against women and in favor of men.'
How is she to choose between her prior hypothesis (which I will call the
"case" hypothesis) and this ("sex based") one? The next three sections
address this issue of selecting the most plausible explanation from among
competing hypotheses.
H. Assessing Causal Plausibility
Philosophers and programmers working in the realm of artificial
intelligence have recently made major contributions to this selection
process. Yun Peng and James A. Reggia, in Abductive Inference Models
for Diagnostic Problem-Solving,"s and Thagard, in Explanatory
183.
1will assume, without repeating the prior analysis, that the sex-based theory
meets the tests of context, temporal priority, and linkage just discussed.
184.
It may be that a social stigma attached to a female drunk, while male
drunkenness is more tolerantly viewed. Women then would be punished for attempting
to use intoxication as a defense.
185.
ABDUCTIVE,supra note 59.
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Coherence,1" have within the last two years successfully modeled
decision processes which took causal theories as inputs and rated their
plausibility. Both treat causal relations and explanations as "primitives."
(A primitive is a given in the computer's logic structure. It must be
supplied by the programmer and cannot be computed from data fed to the
program. Because of this feature, a primitive need not be defined.) They
do not say how the explanations are developed or causes hypothesized.
Rather they take the hypothetical causes or explanations as givens and
seek to rank them. They step into the process at precisely the point our
hypothetical lawyer has now reached. The tests that they elected to apply
share some important similarities that will help the lawyer here.'"
Peng, Reggia, and Thagard all suggest that she submit her
hypotheses or causal explanations to the following two additional tests to
determine which is the best available explanation of her data. Do these
theories "cover" all the relevant data that she has observed?"" And do
the theories offer the simplest explanation of those data available?"'
Both criteria are data driven; that is, they test theories against the actual
observations that the lawyer has made." g I will take each separately.
1. COVER THEORY

If you will refer back to Table VI, you will see that each causal
hypothesis that the lawyer advances covers all her data. There is no case
here in which a weak legal case won the heart of her judge or where a
186.
Thagard, supra note 146.
187.
This is interesting because the causal theories that they are appraising lie in
very different realms. As the name of their book discloses,. Peng and Reggia are
interested in.diagnostic applications of causal reasoning. They seek to model medical
diagnosis in the program they describe. Thagard, on the other hand, is interested in
ranking rival scientific theories or forensic arguments. Nevertheless, both share the task
of finding the best causal hypothesis.
There is an additional methodological point of interest. The programs that embody
their theories are all written as parallel nets. This represents admissions in both cases that
the reasoning required to make these assessments must keep multiple variables operative
at once, that the interaction of these variables must be parallel, and that large numbers of
computations are required. They are modeling highly complex and non-linear mental
processes.
188.
See ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 7, 22-24, 255-58; Thagard, supra note
146, at 436-38.
189.
See ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 7, 22-24, 255-58; Thagard, supra note
146, at 436-38.
190.
ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 28-33 (answers to the questions generated by
the system used in an hypothesis and test model); Thagard, supra note 146, at 437-38,
442-43 ("evidence" provided by the programmer is the sole initial energy source for the
system).
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jury was not stirred by sympathy for an appropriate defendant. Nor is
there any case in which a man was convicted or a woman acquitted. But
what if on her next matter, the case at issue here, the client is female and
in the lawyer's judgment sympathetic, she does not waive jury, and yet
the defendant is convicted? See Table VII for this new situation. How
should the lawyer deal with this aberration? First, of course, she should
reappraise her sense of the sympathetic nature of her client. She may just
have 'a problem of misclassification. But assuming that she remains
convinced that she classified correctly, Peng and Reggia would give her
different advice from Thagard. Thagard would simply decrease the
strength of the "case" theory she advanced, but if the better "sex based"
theory had not emerged, he would not exclude this "case" hypothesis.191
Peng and Reggia would regard the "case" hypothesis by itself as
untenable whether or not the "sex based" theory was available. Some
other hypothesis would have to be coupled with it to explain the otherwise
unexplained data."
191.
Thagard, supra note 146, at 438. At some point acceptability might be so
reduced that the theory would not pass muster, but the mere existence of unexplained
evidence is not immediately fatal.
192.
ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 7, 104. Their program assumes that no
symptom can occur which is not explained by a disorder. They would permit her to
salvage the hypothesis by joining it to another that explained the anomaly, but by itself
it is discredited.
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This difference in approach may well be traceable to the different
systems that the theorists seek to model. Peng and Reggia are modeling
diagnostic systems. They assume by definition that all symptoms are
relevant and are explained by causes already identified in the system. 1
The price of this assumption is a necessarily relaxed view of simplicity as
I will discuss below. Thagard is modeling scientific and forensic
argument. 1
He seeks to find the best theory among competing
contenders, and he is working in a universe where each piece of evidence
cannot necessarily be presumed germane. Thus he has a broader
tolerance for anomalous conditions."'
In any event, both agree that the lawyer ought to look with a
jaundiced eye at her "case" hypothesis should it fail as described.
Perhaps she needs to add another feature, such as the strength of the
prosecution's evidence on intent, if she seeks to improve that causal
model. A failure to cover known data should trigger hypothesis
reappraisal, if not certain rejection. Here the "sex based" hypothesis
would clearly be favored on these data. It provides the best cover.
2. SIMPLICITY

For purposes of the next test, let me revert to the data set forth in
Table VI. This defendant has not been tried and the data give no basis
to distinguish between the theories on the basis of cover. The notion of
simplicity as a desirable feature of explanatory theories dates at least from
William of Occam, an English philosopher in the 1200s. "Occam's
Razor" though honed on the strop of theological dispute," has come
to mean generally that "the fewest possible assumptions are to be made
in explaining a thing."" Several arguments justified application of the
193.
Id. at 5-6, 133. If an available explanation does not account for all
symptoms, something else must be amiss.
Finally, [the mandatory causation assumption] ... is a very basic assumption
in a diagnostic world. It combines the fact that any manifestation cannot be
present unless it is caused by some disorder and the closed-world assumption
that all possible causative disorders are explicitly listed in D. To the authors'
knowledge, this cause-effect relationship assumption has not been made in the
past.
Id. at 106.
194.
He tests his program on scientific controversies (Darwinian evolution versus
creationism, for example) and to a lesser extent on evidence from trials. Thagard, supra
note 146, at 443-53.
195.
For a discussion of the similar handling of anomalies in inductive reasoning,
see supra Section III.F.
196.
WEBSTER'S NEw BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 746 (1988).
197.
OXFORD, supra note 64, at 819.
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simplicity criterion. Peng and Reggia suggest that it is used in deference
to the short term memory limits of humans which preclude more complex
explanatory chains or as a generally successful rule of thumb.1 "
Thagard and others see it as a measure of coherence, providing inherent
plausibility to the explanation being evaluated. 1
Peng, Reggia, and
Thagard share a commitment to simplicity although they define it
differently. For Thagard the number of theoretical propositions required
to contribute to the explanation of a result is the inverse measure of
coherence and simplicity.' ° Peng and Reggia hold a broader view
because, in their system, more than one fault may be required to explain
all the symptoms present."
A simple count of operative causes will
not do. They prefer a test that measures simplicity, or parsimony as they
call it, by the test of irredundance. A parsimonious explanation is one
that involves no more causes than are required to account for the
symptoms present.2m
Under either of these approaches, the lawyer should look to see
which of her causal hypotheses was the simplest. On the evidence
available, a conjunct theory which takes into account both the fact finder
and nature of the case or of the defendant requires two explanatory
propositions to explain the results observed while the "sex based"
hypothesis requires only one. Under either test, the "sex based"
hypothesis is the simplest. Even if the "case" theory covered all the
cases, she should nevertheless prefer the explanation that offers the
greater simplicity.
It is evident, of course, that neither of these tests provide the lawyer
an absolute guarantee that the "sex based" hypothesis, with its assumption
about judge and jury prejudice, really reflects the motivation of those
adjudicators. The hypothesis is always subject to disconfirmation through
a failure to cover the acquittal of a subsequently tried woman, or it may
be challenged by another equally simple proposition. Until these events
occur, however, the lawyer would be using good judgment to advise her
female clients that they were likely to fare poorly with this defense.

198.
ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 7.
199.
Thagard, supra note 146, at 437. For Kenneth S. Friedman, simplicity
means testability. If an explanation may be confirmed or disconfirmed by the imposition
of fewer tests than its competitor, that explanation is simpler and more plausible.
KENNETH S. FRIEDMAN, PREDICTIVE SIMPLICrrY xii-xiii, 55-56 (1990).
200.
Thagard, supra note 146, at 442.
201.
ABDUCTIVE, supra note 59, at 262.
202.
Id. at 117-20.
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I. Should Causal Explanations Be Preferredto Probability
Calculations?
Assuming that a causal or explanatory hypothesis meets these tests
of co-variance and causal connection, and is optimized using cover and
simplicity, would not all decision theorists agree that that hypothesis
provides the best basis for prediction in the face of uncertainty? Should
not the lawyer rely on the implications of such a tested hypothesis as
opposed to those devised from standard probability analysis? After all,
if I know what makes an event happen, are not my predictions much
better than if I only know its frequency? Surprisingly a substantial group
of cognitive psychologists and decision theorists say no.
Included in their ranks are Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky,
Richard Nisbett, and Lee Ross, very prominent thinkers on, and careful
empirical students of, human decision making. These critics offer three
basic objections to the causal approach to decision making. These
objections are: decision makers' sense of co-variation is too unreliable to
permit formation of good causal theories; people prize causal explanations
too highly with the result that they will adopt the first plausible argument
that comes along; and finally, once a causal theory has been adopted, it
will be maintained by decision makers even in the face of substantial
refuting evidence.
.I have discussed co-variation problems before. There is substantial
evidence that people do not do this work well.'
Experiments in the
skill of causal attribution make this point. It is possible, simply by
changing a decision maker's line of sight in observing a situation, to alter
that observer's sense of who caused an event.'
In one experiment,
observers watched a conversation. They could see one party well, but the
other poorly. They uniformly rated the party they could see well as
causing the conversation to proceed as it did. This notion of control
through line of sight is, of course, one which trial advocacy teachers help
students to exploit in presenting a direct or cross, so this finding should
come as no surprise to lawyers. In the case of direct, students are
advised to fade into the woodwork behind the jury so that the witness is
seen as powerful and credible. On cross, for converse reasons, the
students are advised to draw the attention of the jury to themselves. If
trial advocacy teachers did not believe that the jury's sense of co-variation
could be influenced by these maneuvers, this advice would make little
sense. But if the ability to observe causal co-variation is amenable to
203.
204.

See supra Section 111.G.
See HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 27, at 125.
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such subversion, it does give pause to the assumption that Mill's tests or
other co-variation detection devices will prove workable in the real world.
On the other hand, if people are not good at co-variation detection
in the causal context, that defect extends to the inductive and decision
This criticism does not seem uniquely to
theory models as well.'
disable causal reasoning, but rather to infect any process that attempts to
bring past experience to bear on present uncertainty. People may not be
very good at doing this, but they have no choice.
The second criticism, however, is aimed specifically at the causal
model. You will recall that when I was discussing temporal priority,'
I cited an experiment showing that subjects favor causal explanations even
in the face of temporal ambiguity. A similar experiment shows that this
preference persists when a fact could equally be either causal or
diagnostic. Tversky and Kahneman administered this problem in the
1970s:'
Problem 9: Which of the following two probabilities is higher?
P(R IH) The probability that there will be rationing of fuel
for individual consumers in the US during the 1990s, if you
assume that a marked increase in the use of solar energy for
home heating will occur in the 1980s.
P(R I H) The probability that there will be rationing of fuel
for individual consumers in the US during the 1990s, if you
assume that no marked increase in the use of solar energy for
home heating will occur during the 1980s.
Sixty-eight of their eighty-three respondents said that rationing was less
likely if solar heating was increased than if it was not. Subjects
disproportionately saw the failure to save heating oil in the 1980s as
making a shortage in the 1990s more likely. But the facts could equally
have been read to indicate a mounting energy crisis spanning the two
decades in which both increase in solar heating and adoption of rationing
were diagnostic symptoms of that crisis.'
I shall discuss below the
implications of the fact that co-varying events can easily be joint
symptoms of a third cause rather than having any causal relation to each
other.'
In the meantime, Tversky and Kahneman have shown that the
205.
See supra Section III.G.
206.
See supra Section IV.F.
207.
See Causal Schemas, supra note 170, at 124-25.
208.
Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman suggest that the diagnostic rather than the
causal reading is to be preferred because it is unlikely that sufficient savings could be
made from solar heating to stave off a true energy crisis.
209.
See infra Section V.J.
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tendency to assume a surface causal relation is pronounced. People do in
fact see causes where there may not be any.
This becomes a particular problem when it is confounded by the third
observation that once causal explanations are formed, they are very
difficult to shake. I have already discussed this problem as well in the
context of induction. 10 It is the issue of accommodating anomalies.
You will recall that Holland et al. hypothesized that decision makers
retain disconfirmed rules longer than perhaps they should by developing
particular case exceptions. There is evidence that those decision makers
adjust to unwelcome data in other ways as well. Nancy Pennington and
Reid Hastie have shown that mock jurors remember different facts
depending upon the stories which they construct to decide their verdicts
Not only do they forget facts that are incongruent with their stories, they
remember facts that were not there.
In a study of the effects of
disconfirming data, Lee Ross and Craig Anderson report that subjects
who felt strongly about capital punishment were asked to read two
separate "studies" one purporting to provide empirical support for their
position and the other supporting the opposing view. The "study" that
did not support the subjects' prior positions was attacked by them as
methodologically flawed, and the subjects ended the experiment by
holding their previous positions more strongly than they had prior to
exposure to the "studies."
Such evidence certainly shows that there is a tight link between the
explanations that decision makers adopt and the evidence that they elect
to recognize. That very different views of underlying facts can give rise
to plausible arguments both about what really happened in the past and
what should happen in the future comes as no news bulletin to lawyers.
That, after all, is why we insist on two plausible theorizers contesting
each other's premises and conclusions in our trial courtrooms. On the
other hand, this critique is not unique to causal thinking. Resistance to
abandoning preconceptions has been demonstrated in many contexts in
which causal hypothesizing is not at issue. Tversky and Kahneman report
an experiment in which subjects were asked to estimate the percentage of
210.
See supra Section III.F.
211.
PENNINOTON, supra note 54, at 105, 107, 114. See supra text accompanying
note 158 for a summary of the research. Jurors holding the defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree inferred a love interest in the case that was not directly evidenced.
Only jurors favoring acquittal pointed to the fact that the defendant had a reputation for
peacefulness. See also Pennington & Hastie: Evidence Evaluation, supra note 154, at
248-50.
212.
Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On
the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in HEURISTICS, supra note
27, at 145.
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African nations in the United Nations. Those subjects were first given a
number determined by the spin of a modified roulette wheel (a number
which none of them could have regarded as being related in any way to
the true percentage). Subjects for whom the wheel yielded an initial
number of 10 gave a median percentage estimate of 25%, while subjects
whose spin landed on 65 gave a median guess of 45%.213 If people'
cling to initial positions determined by the spin of a roulette wheel, should
it be surprising that it is hard to disabuse them of apparently reasonable
causal theories?
Causal theories are apparently so congenial to human decision
makers that there is substantial danger that once a causal hypothesis has
been developed, no matter how tenuous its supporting evidence, decision
makers will cling unreasonably to that theory.214 Given that this is the
case, what is a wise decision maker to do: abandon causal reasoning or
seek to improve that reasoning by subjecting it to more careful
constraints? In my view this question answers itself based on the very
evidence offered by the critics. I doubt that people can give up causal
reasoning. If that is the case, then improvement rather than abandonment
is the only realistic course.
J. Deficiencies of Pure ProbabilisticJudgments
If probability, by itself, would give a better assurance of
predictability, that might be a different matter, but in at least one
important case, a pure probability model will lead to serious
miscalculation.215 Even perfect co-variation, 100% probability, does
213.
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, in their introduction entitled
Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristicsand Biases, in HEURISTICS, supra note 27, at 1415; HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 27, at 41-42. See also Paul Slovic et al., Response
Mode, Framing, and Information-ProcessingEffects in Risk Assessment, in DECISION
MAKINO, supra note 8, at 161-62.
214.
Nisbett and Ross call this the tendency to "misguided parsimony." See
HUMAN INFERENCE, supra note 27, at 127-30.
215.
One failure of probability to predict outcomes is of little interest here.
Decision theory fails to give an accurate forecast when the improbable happens. Let me
use a gambling analogy first. It is unlikely that a poker player will draw to an inside
straight or that the craps player will "make the point" having failed to throw a seven or
an eleven. See SALMON, supra note 141, at 195-96. Smart money would bet against both
events. But in these forms of gambling, the smart money is wrong frequently enough to
keep many players in the game.
For my purposes this phenomenon is relatively unimportant because, while
probability forms a deficient base for prediction in such matters, causal reasoning as I
have described it does no better. Isolating the "cause" of a particular roll of the dice
would require a physics beyond that which will ever be readily available in the real world.
So although those physics are clearly the cause, that cause is unknowable.
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not guarantee causality. Let me give an example; a barometer moves up
and down in fair correlation with changes in the weather. If the
barometric pressure falls, assuming no change in elevation, bad weather
is very likely. But no one would say that a falling barometer causes bad
weather nor would one seek to avoid bad weather by pumping up the
barometer.2 16 Rather people familiar with weather patterns recognize
that an independent cause-the arrival of a low pressure system-produces
both the fall in the barometer and the bad weather. 217 This pattern of
co-variation evidencing an as yet unsuspected outside cause goes by the
name of the "conjunctive fork," 218 and correlations which ignore the
underlying cause are labeled "spurious." 219 So even 100% correlation,
if it is spurious, can cause a decision maker to seriously misjudge the
world through adopting the wrong causal argument. An example from
the legal realm lies in the treatment of bail. Throughout most of
American history, it was assumed that the threat of bail forfeiture caused
criminal defendants to appear to face trial. Thus, bail was required in
almost every case. A study done by the VERA Foundation in New
York showed that pre-existing ties to the community, with or without
bail, insured appearance."1 The ability to post bail, rather than causing
216.
If the example of misguided attacks on barometers strikes you as far fetched,
let me give you another example involving the same instrument. If all the decision maker
knows is the correlation between bad weather and a falling barometer, she may conclude
that every time she climbs a mountain with her barometer that rain is imminent. Because
she lacks a causal theory about why barometers behave as they do, she does not realize
that the loss of atmospheric pressure occasioned by the gain in altitude drops the
barometer just as effectively as an approaching low pressure system. In fact, of course,
barometers carried in airplanes are called altimeters and are prized precisely because of
this property.
217. -There is a class of instances of this type known as Newcomb's problems. See
ELLERY EELLS, RATIONAL DECISION AND CAUSALITY (1982); Robert Nozick, Newcomb's
Problem and Two Principlesof Choice, in RATIONALITY, supra note 28, at 207; David
Lewis, Causal Decision Theory, in RATIONALITY, supra note 28, at 235.
218.
See SALMON, supra note 141, at 158-68. Salmon credits Hans Reichenbach
with coining the term "conjunctive fork." Id. at 158. Problems of this type were used
by Tversky and Kahneman to show people's predisposition to accept what may be a
spurious causal explanation. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
219.
See EELLS: PROBABILISTIC, supra note 172, at 59 (defining a spurious
correlation as one in which "neither [correlated] factor causes the other and the correlation
disappears when a third variable is introduced and 'held fixed'").
220.
The Foundation was created by industrialist Louis Schweitzer to address
problems of pretrial detention. It was named for his mother.
221.
Sc the report of Herbert J. Sturz, the executive director of the VERA
Foundation, on the Manhattan Bail Project, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43-51 (Robert M. Fogelson ed., 1974). As of the time of that report
the "Project" had released 2630 criminal defendants without bond on personal
recognizance (promise to return). Ninety-nine percent of those released voluntarily
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return for trial, was itself a function of some forms of community ties.
The entire bail system, as a vehicle for insuring presence, was based on
a "spurious" causal judgment.
Such spurious correlations establish that probability is not an
infallible guide to prediction. If decisions are governed by correlation
alone, the decision maker may be misled into believing that the
correlation will hold even when the true underlying cause is absent. A
defendant with ready cash, but no community ties, may be likely to post
bond and disappear.
One more thought, in passing, on this issue. Throughout this
Article, I have been wrestling with the role of coincidence or the product
rule for conjunctive probability for decision making. You will recall that
in the decision theory model, the adoption of the product rule requires
decision makers to treat coincidence as unlikely and strongly decrease the
probability of the co-occurrence of two events.' Cohen, in developing
his theory of induction, proposed that a coincidence should be viewed as
at least as likely as its least likely aspect. Coincidence did not drive down
probability as it did in decision theory, but it did not materially contribute
But, what is the conjunctive fork
to understanding the phenomena.'
if not the epitome of coincidence? If two events, each rare by itself,
always co-occur, the decision maker can conclude something affirmative
based on that co-occurrence. It is highly likely that either one event
causes the other or a third event causes them both. In any case, some
causal relationship is almost certainly afoot. Rather than making us less
willing to accept a co-occurrence as likely-as decision theory
advises-coincidence may by its very rarity, when coupled with
persistence, convince a decision maker that some powerful underlying
explanation is at work.
The point will become clearer if I look at how the English language
treats the word "coincidence." In its simplest meaning the word signifies
co-occurrence: the meaning of joint events attached by decision theory.
But at a secondary level the word takes on either the naif or sardonic
meaning of "a remarkable concurrence of events or circumstances without
The point is, of course, that the coapparent causal connection."'
occurrence of events may in itself be sufficient evidence that a causal link
returned for trial. The study, which was replicated elsewhere (ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 48
(1968)), was jointly funded by the Ford Foundation and the Institute of Judicial
Administration of New York University Law School. See also RONALD GOLDFARB,
RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 150-84 (1965).
See supra Section II.E.
222.
223.
See supra Section III.B.
OXFORD, supra note 64, at 220.
224.
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does exist between the phenomena involved. If such a causal link does
exist, co-occurrence is more, rather than less, likely. The prime debate
between decision theory and causal explanation lies in precisely this
different treatment of some joint probabilities.
K. Swnmary
Causal reasoning has its risks as the cognitive psychologists cited
here stress. Decision makers may be incorrect in perceiving correlations
of supposed cause and effect People have a tendency to see causal
relationships when two phenomena are correlated and to disregard the
issues of temporal precedence or the possibility of a third, unidentified
causal element. Once a decision maker has adopted a causal explanation,
she will be loath to relinquish it.
On the other hand, it seems very likely that decision makers will use
causal reasoning despite these drawbacks. Also, in the case of the
conjunctive fork, true causal analysis always provides a better guide than
do probability judgments.
Therefore, it seems to me better to attempt to improve causal
That
reasoning, rather than to dismiss it as a flawed strategy.
improvement would include: greater care in co-variance analysis as
exemplified by Mill's tests; attention to the temporal relations of cause
and effect; review of the supposed cause to insure that it fits the problem
context; and establishing that the necessary link has occurred between the
supposed cause and its result. Once viable possible causes are identified
using those tests, a choice among those causal candidates should be
premised on their coverage and simplicity. A cause so identified is
unlikely to harbor the defects that the psychologists fear.
V. CONCLUSION

In a moment I will relate what is known of Clarence Darrow's use
of these methods of decision making, but let me first summarize the
conclusions of this Article. Three methods of decision making commend
themselves to lawyers seeking to predict uncertain events: decision theory,
inductive probability, and causal reasoning. Each has its strengths and
weaknesses.
Decision theory handles structured problems, like settlement
decisions, well. For less structured enquiries like the decision as to
whether to take a case, decision theory asks the practitioner to assume
that she has identified all of the key variables and that she knows the
degree of likelihood attached to each. The lawyer faced with such a
decision may well feel uncomfortable with these demands. In that case,
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the less structured, more tentative approach afforded by inductive
probability may be more congenial.
Inductive probability gives up the controlled rationality of decision
theory and is thus less satisfactory in areas in which problems are wellstructured. But precisely because of its incremental approach to issues,
it lends itself to questions where the relevant variables are not selfevident. In fact, the major undertaking of inductive reasoning is the
attempt to insure, in the face of inherent uncertainty, that all relevant
variables are examined. Inductive probability is thus both less dogmatic
in its requirements for such certainty of total coverage and more
constructive in its methods for securing such coverage. That feature is
what makes it useful in less structured problems such as case acceptance.
Mathematically, inductive probability expressly rejects the
assumption of decision theory that the probability of all competing events
must sum to one. That is, it rejects decision theory's postulate that the
decision maker knows all the contingencies and can assign probability
values to them. This is the root difference between the two methods.
Both decision theory and inductive probability deal in likelihoods or
probabilities. Causal reasoning goes beyond probability in an attempt to
explain why events occur. It builds on a foundation of co-variance
observations but adds a further analytical step. It is suited particularly to
those problems in which the lawyer is trying to decide what motivates
others, be they judges, jurors or parties. In this Article, I examined the
decision to waive or to retain a jury in a criminal case. Causal reasoning
enjoys frequent use because it may be the only way available to answer
questions of this sort.
Causal reasoning departs from decision theory most notably in its
treatment of the probabilities of conjoined events. The occurrence of two
unlikely events may, in that system, have a higher probability than the
solitary occurrence of one alone. The prime debate between decision
theory and causal explanation lies precisely in this different treatment of
some joint probabilities.
Which then, if any of these methods, did Darrow use in deciding his
strategy in the Leopold and Loeb case? There is no source of which I am
aware in which the lawyer privately, and therefore candidly, set forth his
thinking. But Darrow did address the issue in his closing argument itself.
Baited by the prosecution for his unwillingness to trust the case to a jury,
Darrow acknowledged that he had reasons for preferring a bench hearing.
It is unlikely that, in the course of carefully crafted advocacy, Darrow
shared his entire decision process with his adversaries and the Court, but
this is what he said:
We did plead guilty before Your Honor because we were
afraid to submit our case to a jury. I would not for a moment
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deny to this court or to this community a realization of the
serious danger we were in and how perplexed we were before
we took this more unusual step.
I can tell Your Honor why.
I have found that years and experience with life tempers
one's emotions and makes him more understanding of his
fellow-man.

I am aware that as one grows older he is less critical. He
is not so sure. He is inclined to make some allowance for his
fellow-man. I am aware that a court has more experience, more
judgment and more kindliness than a jury.

I know perfectly well that where responsibility is divided
by twelve, it is easy to say: "Away with him."
But, Your Honor, if these boys hang, you must do it.
There can be no division of responsibility here. You can never
explain that the rest overpowered you. It must be by your
deliberate, cool, premeditated act, with no chance to shift
responsibility.

Now, let us see, Your Honor, what we had to sustain us
[in making the decision to plead]. Of course, I have known
Your Honor for a good many years. Not intimately. I could
not say that I could even guess from my experience what Your
Honor might do, but I did khow something. I knew, Your
Honor, that ninety unfortunate human beings had been hanged
by the neck until dead in the city of Chicago in our history.
Some ninety human beings have been hanged in the history of
Chicago, and of those only four have been hanged on the plea
of guilty-one out of twenty-two.
I know that in the last ten years four hundred and fifty
people have been indicted for murder in the city of Chicago and
have pleaded guilty. Four hundred and fifty have pleaded guilty
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in the city of Chicago, and only one has been hangedl And my
friend who is prosecuting this case deserves the honor of that
hanging when he was on the bench. But his victim was forty
years old.
Your Honor will never thank me for unloading this
responsibility upon you, but you know that I would have been
untrue to my clients if I had not concluded to take this chance
before a court, instead of submitting it to a poisoned jury in the
city of Chicago. I did it knowing that it would be an unheardof thing for any court, no matter who, to sentence these boys to
death.
And, so far as that goes, Mr Savage [the prosecutor] is
right. I hope, Your Honor, that I have made no mistake.'
From this speech, it seems to me that Darrow used at least two of the
three decision methods discussed here and may have used them all. He
does not discuss a decision theory calculation, but it would be very
surprising in this context if he laid out for the Court his decision tree.
Yet it is clear that he has done some probability calculations for he knows
that of people hanged in Chicago throughout its history, less than 5% had
plead guilty. And he knows that, within the last ten years, only 2% of
those pleading guilty were hanged. These likelihood data could figure in
either decision theory or inductive probability calculations.
It is also clear that Darrow is engaged in causal reasoning. Age
promotes mercy he says, and it is more difficult to kill when the
responsibility rests with a single decision maker than when it is distributed
among twelve.
While I have no certainty as to how lawyers in general go about
decision making, I could surely do worse than draw to your attention
methods which worked for such an able advocate in such treacherous
circumstances.

225.

DAMNED, supra note 2, at 23-25.

